During the intermittent rounds of fighting in the Gaza Strip since 2008, Cairo has served as an intermediary between the Hamas regime and Jerusalem, which naturally eschew direct contact with each other. Even under the pro-Hamas rule of Muhammad Morsi, and all the more so under the anti-Islamist rule of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Egypt has been the sole power able to restrain the terrorist group somewhat. Eran Lerman argues that Israel benefits from having its southern neighbor in this position:

Today, the relationship [between Israel and Egypt] has reached new heights, due to their shared efforts against terror in Sinai, on one hand, and against Turkish subversion in the eastern Mediterranean, on the other hand. With a partnership in restoring calm in Gaza, and in an age of integration in the field of energy supply, there may even some change in the generally shrill anti-Israel atmosphere in the Egyptian public sphere. In this respect, the creation, in Cairo, of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF)—bringing together Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy—is another step in that direction.

At the same time, the mediation is of great importance for Egypt itself. . . . A severe deterioration of the situation in Gaza, and a level of distress that may lead to pressure to throw the border open, are viewed in Cairo as a nightmare. The last thing that Egypt needs are millions more mouths to feed. Beyond that, the growing grip by Egyptian intelligence on events in Gaza can serve to force the Palestinian terror groups to cease and desist from all aid to the “Sinai Province” of Islamic State and other subversive elements in the peninsula. . . . At present, Egypt seems to have achieved an effective deterrence against further Palestinian support for terror groups in Sinai. . . .

Over time, the combination of Israeli pressures, a deterrent effect (even if limited and fragile), and intense Egyptian engagement, all help to erode the myth of the jihadist “resistance” [on which Hamas stakes its legitimacy]. The Hamas leadership’s diplomatic and military efforts of the past year are overtly designed to extract material gains. As such, they also raise—in a certain sense—questions about the movement’s ideological commitment to jihad at all costs. Thus, the very reliance upon Egypt, at times of crisis and distress, may indicate that in the regional power struggle among ideological camps, the Islamists are not quite sure that they still have the upper hand.

Yesterday, Israel’s Channel 12 reported that Israeli representatives have been involved in secret talks, brokered by the United Arab Emirates, with their Syrian counterparts about the potential establishment of diplomatic relations between their countries. Even more surprisingly, on Wednesday an Israeli reporter spoke with a senior official from Syria’s information ministry, Ali al-Rifai. The prospect of a member of the Syrian government, or even a private citizen, giving an on-the-record interview to an Israeli journalist was simply unthinkable under the old regime. What’s more, his message was that Damascus seeks peace with other countries in the region, Israel included.

These developments alone should make Israelis sanguine about Donald Trump’s overtures to Syria’s new rulers. Yet the interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa’s jihadist resumé, his connections with Turkey and Qatar, and brutal attacks on minorities by forces aligned with, or part of, his regime remain reasons for skepticism. While recognizing these concerns, Noah Rothman nonetheless makes the case for optimism:

The old Syrian regime was an incubator and exporter of terrorism, as well as an Iranian vassal state. The Assad regime trained, funded, and introduced terrorists into Iraq intent on killing American soldiers. It hosted Iranian terrorist proxies as well as the Russian military and its mercenary cutouts. It was contemptuous of U.S.-backed proscriptions on the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield, necessitating American military intervention—an unavoidable outcome, clearly, given Barack Obama’s desperate efforts to avoid it. It incubated Islamic State as a counterweight against the Western-oriented rebel groups vying to tear that regime down, going so far as to purchase its own oil from the nascent Islamist group.

The Assad regime was an enemy of the United States. The Sharaa regime could yet be a friend to America. . . . Insofar as geopolitics is a zero-sum game, taking Syria off the board for Russia and Iran and adding it to the collection of Western assets would be a triumph. At the very least, it’s worth a shot. Trump deserves credit for taking it.