For some time, Israel has followed the principle of “quiet will be met with quiet” in dealing with the Gaza Strip—and with its enemies in Syria and elsewhere. In practice this means that so long as Hamas does not launch rockets or conduct other attacks, the IDF will not engage it militarily, but any attacks will be met with a swift military response. To Amos Yadlin, the recent flareups show that this strategy is losing its effectiveness:

The positive aspect of the recent round against Gaza was the return, by the IDF, to the targeted killing of militants, the bombing of rocket-manufacturing facilities and warehouses, and the destruction of military installations and high-rise apartment blocks. . . .

The Israeli public, [however, remains] in the dark about the parameters of the long-term cease-fire agreement being negotiated with Hamas. What is known is that Israel is continuing to [allow the transfer of funds to] a terrorist organization but is refusing to talk to a legitimate, internationally recognized, Palestinian Authority. The message to Palestinians is clear: using terror against Israel is a means to achieve your desired objectives.

Above all else, Israel’s deterrence is shattered. Hamas is no longer fazed by the prospect of a military confrontation. The militant group still fears a full-blown war, but that too will change. The policy of “quiet will be met by quiet” or “quiet in exchange for money” is no longer viable. . . . It is time to begin reinstating Israel’s deterrence by causing massive injury to the military wing of Hamas, enemy loss of life notwithstanding—[including] the use of targeted killing of militant commanders, preferably carried out with surprising, unexpected tactics. The key here is the need to take initiative rather than responding and being led.

Surveying news websites and social media on Sunday morning, I immediately found some intelligent and well-informed observers arguing that Iran deliberately warned the U.S. of its pending assault on Israel, and calibrated it so that there would be few casualties and minimal destructiveness, thus hoping to avoid major retaliation. In other words, this massive barrage was a face-saving gesture by the ayatollahs. Others disagreed. Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan put the issue to rest:

The Iranian April 13 missile-drone attack on Israel was very likely intended to cause significant damage below the threshold that would trigger a massive Israeli response. The attack was designed to succeed, not to fail. The strike package was modeled on those the Russians have used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect. The attack caused more limited damage than intended likely because the Iranians underestimated the tremendous advantages Israel has in defending against such strikes compared with Ukraine.

But that isn’t to say that Tehran achieved nothing:

The lessons that Iran will draw from this attack will allow it to build more successful strike packages in the future. The attack probably helped Iran identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli air-defense system. Iran will likely also share the lessons it learned in this attack with Russia.

Iran’s ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses with even a small number of large ballistic missiles presents serious security concerns for Israel. The only Iranian missiles that got through hit an Israeli military base, limiting the damage, but a future strike in which several ballistic missiles penetrate Israeli air defenses and hit Tel Aviv or Haifa could cause significant civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, including ports and energy. . . . Israel and its partners should not emerge from this successful defense with any sense of complacency.