In 2007, Israeli intelligence determined that Syria had built a clandestine nuclear reactor—clearly intended for developing nuclear weapons—in a remote desert region. As the cabinet and military brass debated what to do, it was becoming increasingly clear that the reactor was set to go “hot” imminently, thus making an attack much more dangerous. By the time then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert ordered an airstrike, he had concluded that it had to take place immediately. Yaakov Katz, in a passage from his recent book on the subject, tells the story:

The night before [the decision was reached], on September 4, the air force had carried out its last training flight, this time dropping live bombs over an imaginary target in the Negev desert. After months of training, [during which they did not know the nature of the mission], the pilots were as ready as they would ever be. The IDF chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi and the air-force general Eliezer Shkedi had been there to watch. Shkedi, who had flown with them on one of the earlier training sessions, now gathered the pilots in the squadron’s briefing room. “Your mission is to bomb a nuclear reactor in Syria,” he told the airmen who looked at one another in disbelief. “It is of utmost importance for the safety and security of the Jewish people and the state of Israel.”

Shkedi told the pilots that the operation had three objectives: destroy the reactor, return to Israel without losing any aircraft, and complete the mission as quietly as possible and without detection. The name the air force gave the operation said it all: Soft Melody. . . .

At around 10:30 p.m., four F-15s took off from the Hatzerim base in southern Israel and another four F-16s from the Ramon base in the Negev desert. Altogether, the planes were carrying around twenty tons of bombs, more than enough to destroy a building less than 2,000 meters square. Some of the bombs were equipped with satellite guidance systems. Each had a different level of penetration. This way, if one didn’t work, the others could compensate. . . .

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.