When fires raged across central Israel last month, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Egypt, and Cyprus all sent firefighting aircraft to help put out the flames; even the Palestinian Authority (PA) sent its firefighters to pitch in. In January, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Egypt, and the PA formed an official consortium to cooperate in the extracting and exporting natural gas. These economic and civilian relationships also have diplomatic and military parallels, in the form of regular meetings and even joint military exercises. Taking stock of these developments, Eran Lerman highlights the shared goals of the emerging eastern Mediterranean alliance:

The [recent] IDF deployments to Cyprus, albeit scheduled long in advance, took place in the wake of the latest provocative acts by Turkey—prospecting in the Cypriot exclusive economic zone. This is but part of a pattern [of Ankara’s aggression against its local enemies]. Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly lashed out at Israel. His agents are trying to stir trouble in Jerusalem. He speaks of re-opening discussion of the demarcation of the Greek border in the Aegean. Turkey has meddled in Libya, supporting the Sarraj government in Tripoli, associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Turkish military now has bases in Qatar and Sudan. . . .

For Israel as well as for Sisi’s Egypt, their [respective] tripartite dialogues [with Athens and Nicosia] are also a useful check against problematic winds blowing from Brussels. Since high-level policy decisions in the European system require a general consensus, a close alliance with two members of the EU (or more, if Italy is to be counted) is an important guarantee for both countries against those who seek to impose their own perceptions on the complexities of the Egyptian domestic situation, or on the Israel-Palestinian struggle.

To all of this one might add aspects of cultural affinity, which is being brought into focus this week at the Méditerranée festival in Israel’s port city of Ashdod, bringing performers from Morocco, Greece, and places in-between. The renewed interest in Israel in the legacy of [the Egyptian-born Israeli novelist and journalist] Jaqueline Kahanoff, who sought to elevate the “Levantine” identity into a possible template for Israel’s future, bridging east and west, is another indicator.

Since the war began, there has been a tension between Israel’s two primary goals: the destruction of Hamas and the liberation of the hostages. Many see in Israel’s renewed campaign in Gaza a sacrifice of the latter goal in pursuit of the former. But Meir Ben-Shabbat suggests that Israel’s attacks aim to bring Hamas back to the negotiating table:

The timing of the attack, its intensity, and the extent of casualties surprised Hamas. Its senior leaders are likely still wondering whether this is a limited action meant to shock and send a message or the beginning of a sustained operation. The statement by its senior officials linking the renewal of fighting to the fate of the hostages hints at the way it may act to stop Israel. This threat requires the Israeli political leadership to formulate a series of draconian measures and declare that they will be carried out if Hamas harms the hostages.

Ostensibly, Israel’s interest in receiving the hostages and continuing the fighting stands in complete contradiction to that of Hamas, but in practice Hamas has flexibility that has not yet been exhausted. This stems from the large number of hostages in its possession, which allows it to realize additional deals for some of them, and this is what Israel has been aiming its efforts toward.

We must concede that the challenge Israel faces is not simple, but the alternative Hamas presents—surrendering to its dictates and leaving it as the central power factor in Gaza—limits its options. . . . Tightening and significantly hardening the blockade along with increasing pressure through airstrikes, evacuating areas and capturing them, may force Hamas to make its stance more flexible.

But Ben-Shabbat also acknowledges the danger in this approach. The war’s renewal puts the hostages in greater danger. And as Israel makes threats, it will be obliged to carry them out.