In 2018, a bill was put before the Knesset to expand the number of Ḥaredim conscripted into the Israeli military, while still preserving some of the exemptions for yeshiva students. Because Avigdor Liberman—the head of the Jewish Home party—refuses to join a governing coalition absent a promise the bill will remain unchanged, while the ḥaredi parties will only join the coalition if it is modified, Benjamin Netanyahu has been unable to form a governing coalition. Thus, new elections will be held in September. The former parliamentarian Yohanan Plesner, who served on the Knesset committee that produced an earlier version of the bill, comments:

The appropriate solution [to the conscription problem] would be based on two clear principles: a significant increase in the financial compensation to all those who serve, including the ultra-Orthodox; and encouragement and incentives for the ultra-Orthodox to perform meaningful military service while still young (before age twenty-two), so that after that they can then enroll in vocational training programs and find jobs. [Currently, many choose to study rather than enter the workforce to avoid conscription, as military service is frowned upon by most Ḥaredim.] This is in sharp contrast to the situation today, one in which ultra-Orthodox men who do not serve in the IDF must remain in yeshiva until age twenty-five.

Research . . . has shown that economic and employment incentives have a positive effect on the number of yeshiva students who serve in the IDF. We should not make light of this. The number of those enlisting each year continues to increase. In 2013, 1,972 young ultra-Orthodox men enlisted in the IDF; in 2017, the figure was 3,070, an increase of 45 percent. This is a sharp rise within a short time. Quite naturally there was also a significant increase in the number of ultra-Orthodox men attending institutions of higher [secular] education. . . .

Rather than seeing a useful discussion of possible alternatives, we are witness mainly to personal attacks that threaten to sink the ship of state. Interestingly enough, the conscription law has been one of the most frequent factors in generating coalition crises in Israel, and, even though it was also the trigger for the calling for elections [in April], the recent campaign, which was appallingly personal, did not include a serious discussion of the issue.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.