Appointed by the British in 1921 to the newly created position of grand mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini emerged in the following years as the leader of the Palestinian national movement, and strongly opposed any compromise with Zionism or the Zionists. He encouraged the anti-Jewish riots and massacres of the 1930s, and, as is well known, met with Hitler and collaborated with the Nazis during World War II. After the 1948 war, it was long assumed, he faded from prominence, but recently declassified CIA documents suggest otherwise. Sean Durns writes:

In October 1951, U.S. intelligence warned of a “possible terrorist campaign” by Husseini, “who has the combined forces of the [Muslim] Brotherhood and his own terrorist organization” targeting British nationals in four Arab countries, as well as the “property and personnel of the trans-Arabian pipeline.” The mufti enjoyed close relations with the Brotherhood, which used his “spacious home in Jerusalem” for their “Palestine headquarters.”

U.S. intelligence managed to capture correspondence showing that the mufti was regularly briefed on terrorist activities, and had operatives traversing the Middle East. As late as 1962, he was still plotting to assassinate opponents. And, as late as 1965, the CIA was warning that Husseini “has instructed key followers” in Jordan to “reactivate” old units for attacks against Israel. The agency noted that the mufti was even purchasing “arms and ammunition” that were “remnants of the 1948” conflict.

By 1967, Husseini had reached a détente with King Hussein’s Jordan, which even allowed him to visit Jerusalem shortly before the Six-Day War, hoping that the mufti would help counter Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the then-Egyptian-controlled Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Amazingly enough, the mufti even fed intelligence to Hussein—the man whose grandfather he had had murdered—about Yasir Arafat, a distant cousin of Husseini, whom he formally anointed as his successor following a December 29, 1968 meeting near Beirut.

By the time of his death in Beirut on July 4, 1974, the mufti’s legacy was secure. Arafat would similarly play Arab regimes against each other and make war on the Jewish state. A mosque financed by Husseini and German ex-Nazis has, in recent years, been linked to Islamist terror groups like al-Qaeda. And much of the rhetoric employed by Husseini—such as comparing Zionists to Nazis—remains common today.

On Yom Kippur, Hizballah fired over 200 rockets and drones at Israel, with one drone hitting a retirement home in Herzliya, miraculously without casualties. Yesterday, however, proved less lucky: a drone launched by the Iran-backed group struck a military base, killing four and injuring another 58, about twenty moderately or seriously.

This attack reflects Iranian strategy: Israeli defensive systems are strong, but so are Iranian drones and missiles, and with enough attacks some will get through. As Ariel Kahana writes, such an approach is consistent with Tehran’s desire to fight a war of attrition, denying Jerusalem the chance to strike a decisive blow. Kahana explains how the IDF might turn the tables:

It’s worth noting that Iran’s strategy of wearing down Israel and other U.S. allies in the region is not merely a choice, but a necessity. Militarily, it’s the only card left in Tehran’s hand. Iran neither desires nor possesses the capability to deploy ground forces against Israel, given the vast geographical distance and intervening countries. Moreover, while Israel boasts one of the world’s most formidable air forces, Iran’s air capabilities are comparatively limited.

Israel’s trump card in this high-stakes game is its unparalleled air-defense system. For years, Iran had counted on its network of proxy organizations to provide a protective umbrella against Western strikes. However, a year into the current conflict, this strategy lies in tatters: Hamas is reeling, Hizballah is on the back foot, and the various militias in Iraq and Yemen amount to little more than an irritant for Israel. The result? Iran finds itself unexpectedly exposed.

And when it comes to direct attacks on Israel, Iran’s options may be limited. Its October 1 attack, which used its sophisticated Fateh-2 missiles, was more effective than that in April, but not much more so:

Oded Eilam, drawing on his experience as a former senior Mossad official, . .  estimates [Iran’s] stockpile of these advanced weapons is limited to between 400 and 800. With 200 already expended in a single attack, Iran’s reserves of truly effective missiles may be running low. This raises a critical question: can Iran sustain a prolonged ballistic exchange with Israel? The numbers suggest it’s capacity for attrition warfare may be more limited than it would like to admit.