Currently Israel is home to some 34,000 illegal immigrants, mostly Africans who have entered the country via Egypt in search of economic opportunity. As in Europe, the media routinely refer to these migrants as “refugees,” but that designation, notes Gadi Taub, applies properly only to a tiny fraction. Taub, exploring the social and political tensions that illegal immigration has brought to the fore in Israel, calls attention to the implications for Europe and the America:

Most of these migrants have settled in the southern working-class neighborhoods of Tel Aviv, with its high demand for unskilled labor and easy access to public transportation and social services. Given the predominantly young and male demographic [of the migrants], it is perhaps not surprising that per-capita crime rates within this group are three to four times the national average. Herein lies another parallel to the European situation: Israeli police have only recently released these statistics, after years of dodging requests out of fear they would end up encouraging biases.

But there is more at stake. . . . As is the case everywhere else, the price for high-minded [and] lax immigration policy is paid by the poor as more unskilled workers compete for jobs, social services are stretched, and weak metropolitan neighborhoods become foreign countries to their own older residents, with a sharp increase of violent crime.

As Taub notes, the Israeli press, academia, civil society, and even social-media platforms tend to frame the debate over immigration policy as a conflict “between defenders of human rights on the one hand, and xenophobic nationalists on the other.” The cost of doing so, he argues, is that underlying “issues of democratic sovereignty” are ignored:

The common thread running through . . . efforts to thwart the immigration policies of elected governments is an attempt to bypass the democratic mechanism of decision making. . . . [A]bove all, there are the edicts of a decidedly liberal judiciary, which in Israel has vast powers over the other branches of government without reciprocal checks to balance it. . . . The sweeping powers of the courts can be said to have turned liberal rights from checks on the democratic process into its replacement.

Taking the long view, we should note that this clash between the extreme [liberal vision that sees any immigration restriction as a human-rights violation] and democracy may well be destructive to both. Infringing on the ability of citizens to protect their hard-earned rights is bound to hurt these very rights, since their only real guarantee is the fact that we can dismiss our governments and appoint their replacement. It also reduces citizens to subjects, because liberty without participation in sovereignty robs people of the most crucial right with which democratic nation-states have endowed them: taking part in shaping their collective destiny. Without this most fundamental right, they cannot be, in the beautiful phrase of Israel’s Declaration of Independence, “masters of their own fate, in their own sovereign state.”

Small in area and population and rich in natural gas, Qatar plays an outsize role in the Middle East. While its support keeps Hamas in business, it also has vital relations with Israel that are much better than those enjoyed by many other Arab countries. Doha’s relationship with Washington, though more complex, isn’t so different. Yoel Guzansky offers a comprehensive examination of Israel’s Qatar dilemma:

At first glance, Qatar’s foreign policy seems filled with contradictions. Since 1995, it has pursued a strategy of diplomatic hedging—building relationships with multiple, often competing, actors. Qatar’s vast wealth and close ties with the United States have enabled it to maneuver independently on the international stage, maintaining relations with rival factions, including those that are direct adversaries.

Qatar plays an active role in international diplomacy, engaging in conflict mediation in over twenty regions worldwide. While not all of its mediation efforts have been successful, they have helped boost its international prestige, which it considers vital for its survival among larger and more powerful neighbors. Qatar has participated in mediation efforts in Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones, reinforcing its image as a neutral broker.

Israel’s stated objective of removing Hamas from power in Gaza is fundamentally at odds with Qatar’s interest in keeping Hamas as the governing force. In theory, if the Israeli hostages would to be released, Israel could break free from its dependence on Qatari mediation. However, it is likely that even after such a development, Qatar will continue positioning itself as a mediator—particularly in enforcing agreements and shaping Gaza’s reconstruction efforts.

Qatar’s position is strengthened further by its good relations with the U.S. Yet, Guzansky notes, it has weaknesses as well that Israel could exploit:

Qatar is highly sensitive to its global image and prides itself on maintaining a neutral diplomatic posture. If Israel chooses to undermine Qatar’s reputation, it could target specific aspects of Qatari activity that are problematic from an Israeli perspective.