Since the most recent Israeli elections resulted effectively in a stalemate, a second election has been called for September. Every indication from poll data is that the results will be no more conclusive the second time around, with neither the Likud nor its competitors able to form a coalition. Shmuel Rosner—after noting that a third election would be costly and demoralizing—comments:

The centrist Blue and White party is expected to be the strongest opposition party in the coming Knesset, and a unity government of [it and] Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud would likely be popular among Israelis, a majority of whom believe Netanyahu is the most fit to lead but don’t have much love for his past coalition partners, especially the ultra-Orthodox [parties].

But that’s not the plan of either party because of several factors. First, Netanyahu wants to form a government with his usual allies, the right-wing and religious parties, in part for political reasons: this alliance is easier for him to control, and it has kept Likud in power for many years. . . . Moreover, Blue and White has said it won’t join a government led by Netanyahu under any circumstances. . . . This is not because of ideological differences or competing policy prescriptions. This is about Benjamin Netanyahu. . . . For many Israelis, Netanyahu is the personification of their political grievances and social frustrations.

There are two clear ways to overcome these obstacles. One is for Netanyahu to step aside [as leader of the Likud party] and allow a coalition to form without him. The other is for Blue and White to accept that working with Netanyahu, the most popular politician in Israel, is a necessity. Both options would require the leaders of Likud and of Blue and White to learn to compromise on important principles. . . . It might not seem like the most dignified act, but Israel’s politicians must prevent a third election—for the good of the country.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.