Since the most recent Israeli elections resulted effectively in a stalemate, a second election has been called for September. Every indication from poll data is that the results will be no more conclusive the second time around, with neither the Likud nor its competitors able to form a coalition. Shmuel Rosner—after noting that a third election would be costly and demoralizing—comments:

The centrist Blue and White party is expected to be the strongest opposition party in the coming Knesset, and a unity government of [it and] Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud would likely be popular among Israelis, a majority of whom believe Netanyahu is the most fit to lead but don’t have much love for his past coalition partners, especially the ultra-Orthodox [parties].

But that’s not the plan of either party because of several factors. First, Netanyahu wants to form a government with his usual allies, the right-wing and religious parties, in part for political reasons: this alliance is easier for him to control, and it has kept Likud in power for many years. . . . Moreover, Blue and White has said it won’t join a government led by Netanyahu under any circumstances. . . . This is not because of ideological differences or competing policy prescriptions. This is about Benjamin Netanyahu. . . . For many Israelis, Netanyahu is the personification of their political grievances and social frustrations.

There are two clear ways to overcome these obstacles. One is for Netanyahu to step aside [as leader of the Likud party] and allow a coalition to form without him. The other is for Blue and White to accept that working with Netanyahu, the most popular politician in Israel, is a necessity. Both options would require the leaders of Likud and of Blue and White to learn to compromise on important principles. . . . It might not seem like the most dignified act, but Israel’s politicians must prevent a third election—for the good of the country.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.