Since its creation—only a year before Israel—Pakistan has not had normal relations with the Jewish state. Islamabad has justified this policy on the grounds that friendliness toward Israel would anger its Arab allies, or constitute moral callousness toward Palestinians, or violate Islam. To Saad Hafiz, such rationales are invalid or moot:

[O]ne wonders what strategic benefit Pakistan derives by keeping overtures to Israel on hold in order to curry favor with the Arab world. . . . Since the early years, our brotherly Arabs have treated Pakistan with a mixture of condescension and derision. Initially, Pakistan was labeled a Western lackey and an opponent of Arab nationalism. More recently, rich Arab states have treated Pakistan as a poor relation constantly begging for aid. Also, many Arab states are themselves lining up to establish ties with a militarily and economically strong Israel.

[Moreover], Pakistan is not in a position to . . . influence the resolution of the Palestinian dispute. It is illogical for Pakistan to wait for the complicated situation in the Middle East to resolve itself before establishing a relationship with Israel. . . . There is no conflict between Pakistan’s interests and Israel’s.

We should expect the standard resistance from the Islamist lobby long opposed to a dialogue with Israel on “moral” grounds. We are bound to hear about an American-Jewish conspiracy to entice Pakistan away from the Islamic and Palestinian cause. Stirring the religious beast onto the streets is avoided by governments in Pakistan. It requires inspired and visionary leadership to take on the political risks for opening new diplomatic horizons for Pakistan.

Pakistan needs to reshape its foreign policy in the post-9/11 era. To take advantage of the changing geopolitical situation in the region, Pakistan must develop a multi-pronged approach. Balancing ties with the Muslim world and Israel can maximize Pakistan’s interests. Israel may also see the benefit of an economic partnership with Pakistan, without compromising its burgeoning strategic relationship with India.

As this newsletter noted last week, Gaza is not suffering from famine, and the efforts to suggest that it is—which have been going on since at least the beginning of last year—are based on deliberate manipulation of the data. Nor, as Shany Mor explains, does international law require Israel to feed its enemies:

Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention does oblige High Contracting Parties to allow for the free passage of medical and religious supplies along with “essential foodstuff, clothing, and tonics intended for children under fifteen” for the civilians of another High Contracting Party, as long as there is no serious reason for fearing that “the consignments may be diverted from their destination,” or “that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy” by the provision.

The Hamas regime in Gaza is, of course, not a High Contracting Party, and, more importantly, Israel has reason to fear both that aid provisions are diverted by Hamas and that a direct advantage is accrued to it by such diversions. Not only does Hamas take provisions for its own forces, but its authorities sell provisions donated by foreign bodies and use the money to finance its war. It’s notable that the first reports of Hamas’s financial difficulties emerged only in the past few weeks, once provisions were blocked.

Yet, since the war began, even European states considered friendly to Israel have repeatedly demanded that Israel “allow unhindered passage of humanitarian aid” and refrain from seizing territory or imposing “demographic change”—which means, in practice, that Gazan civilians can’t seek refuge abroad. These principles don’t merely constitute a separate system of international law that applies only to Israel, but prolong the suffering of the people they are ostensibly meant to protect:

By insisting that Hamas can’t lose any territory in the war it launched, the international community has invented a norm that never before existed and removed one of the few levers Israel has to pressure it to end the war and release the hostages.

These commitments have . . . made the plight of the hostages much worse and much longer. They made the war much longer than necessary and much deadlier for both sides. And they locked a large civilian population in a war zone where the de-facto governing authority was not only indifferent to civilian losses on its own side, but actually had much to gain by it.