Israel’s Political Deadlock Is as Much a Symptom of Consensus as of Division

Sept. 26 2019

In the U.S., Israeli politics are generally seen through the prism of the conflict with the Palestinians. While this issue has indeed defined the Jewish state’s domestic politics for decades, the results of the recent election suggest such disagreements animate only the political fringes; for most Israelis, a consensus has emerged. The failed negotiations between the leaders of the two major parties over forming a unity government, writes Jonathan Tobin, are in fact evidence of this consensus:

[T]he main obstacle to a unity government is the question of how offices are to be divided, rather than policies. . . . Israelis are no longer fundamentally divided on questions of war and peace. The ideological gap between the two leading parties has narrowed to the point where the differences between them are minimal. That was made clear when the reaction of Blue and White to Netanyahu’s pre-election declaration that he would annex the Jordan Valley and never abandon settlements—a statement that angered liberal American Jews—was not outrage but a claim that he was trying to steal their platform.

Likud, and Blue and White, are part of a national consensus that there is no Palestinian peace partner, and that further territorial concessions would only be possible in a theoretical future when this was no longer the case.

If so, that reflects how Netanyahu’s worldview has not merely prevailed, but has essentially marginalized the views of his left-wing opponents. In a stroke of bitter irony for the prime minister, it’s also bad news for him since his claim to be the only person who can be trusted with Israel’s security would also be undermined.

Read more at JNS

More about: Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Election 2019, Israeli politics, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Oil Is Iran’s Weak Spot. Israel Should Exploit It

Israel will likely respond directly against Iran after yesterday’s attack, and has made known that it will calibrate its retaliation based not on the extent of the damage, but on the scale of the attack. The specifics are anyone’s guess, but Edward Luttwak has a suggestion, put forth in an article published just hours before the missile barrage: cut off Tehran’s ability to send money and arms to Shiite Arab militias.

In practice, most of this cash comes from a single source: oil. . . . In other words, the flow of dollars that sustains Israel’s enemies, and which has caused so much trouble to Western interests from the Syrian desert to the Red Sea, emanates almost entirely from the oil loaded onto tankers at the export terminal on Khark Island, a speck of land about 25 kilometers off Iran’s southern coast. Benjamin Netanyahu warned in his recent speech to the UN General Assembly that Israel’s “long arm” can reach them too. Indeed, Khark’s location in the Persian Gulf is relatively close. At 1,516 kilometers from Israel’s main airbase, it’s far closer than the Houthis’ main oil import terminal at Hodeida in Yemen—a place that was destroyed by Israeli jets in July, and attacked again [on Sunday].

Read more at UnHerd

More about: Iran, Israeli Security, Oil