Tomorrow Israelis go to the polls for the second election of 2019, in which the two main contenders will be the Likud, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, and the centrist Blue and White, led by Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid. Neither party is likely to have an easy path to forming the 61-seat Knesset majority needed to form a government, a reality that has affected both parties’ campaigns. Haviv Rettig Gur explains how the anomalous political situation has led to something very different from the contest between left-wing and right-wing “blocs” of parties predicted by most analysts, and examines the various possible outcomes:

This is a deeply strange election: a first-of-its-kind redo in a single year; a first-in-a-decade challenge to Likud’s unassailable rule, with [Avigdor Liberman’s right-wing secularist] Yisrael Beytenu party unmoored from the right and demanding a secular unity government [i.e., one that excludes the Orthodox parties]. . . .

[Meanwhile], with neither Netanyahu nor Gantz assured of 61 legislators’ recommendations for the position of prime minister to President Reuven Rivlin, the two leading parties are now in a race to become the largest single faction. Being the biggest party, they believe, will assure them Rivlin’s nomination as prime minister-designate.

And that has meant turning on their own blocs. It is easier to draw a right-wing voter [from the newly formed] Yamina party to Likud through scaremongering about “leftists” than it is to draw a Blue and White voter to within a half-mile of Netanyahu. It is similarly easier to draw a voter from Labor or [the former prime minister Ehud Barak’s newly formed] Democratic Camp to a “secular” campaign by Blue and White than to pull in a far-rightist.

The 22nd Knesset is not likely to agree a second time in a year to a . . . third election. If Gantz offers Liberman sufficiently robust promises of ministries, budgets, and policy influence, Liberman is quite likely to agree to wait it out with him—positioning the Yisrael Beytenu leader as the nation’s kingmaker. . . . In one possible scenario, President Reuven Rivlin might first ask Netanyahu to form a coalition, and Netanyahu might fail to do so before the deadline, in which case Rivlin would give Gantz an opportunity. What then?

Netanyahu’s best hope would be either to negotiate a power-sharing government with Gantz—in which Gantz would be prime minister first. . . . If Netanyahu does not seem willing to join a Gantz government after failing to establish his own, it is safe to assume that the entirety of Gantz’s roughly 42-day negotiating period will consist of one thing and one thing only: convincing Likud to drop Netanyahu, who will have transformed at that point from the party’s greatest electoral asset to the main obstacle preventing it from returning to power, albeit shared power.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.