Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Death Is Good News for Israel, but Doesn’t Mean the End of Islamic State

After months of planning, U.S. special forces attacked the compound in the northeastern Syrian province of Idlib where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—Islamic State’s self-styled caliph—was hiding. When cornered, Baghdadi blew himself up. Ron Ben-Yishai sums up the implications for Islamic State (IS) and for Israel:

Baghdadi’s death may accelerate the occupation of the Idlib enclave by the Assad regime, helped by Russian bombing and backed by Shiite militias operating under Iranian patronage. Islamic State’s Sunni rival, the al-Qaeda organization formerly called Nusra Front, is also active in Idlib and is no less radical or less determined to fight Assad’s regime. Nonetheless, the death of Baghdadi may affect the morale of all the Sunni jihadists now concentrated in Idlib to prepare for the final battle.

According to the United Nations, the organization still has some 30,000 fighters in scattered underground cells in Iraq and Syria; these cells include foreign Muslim civilians from all over the world—from Europe to Chechnya and Afghanistan and the Philippines. IS also has thousands of fighters in the Sinai Peninsula battling the Egyptian army, as well as active and murderous groups in Nigeria, Pakistan, France and Belgium. And this is only a partial list.

Baghdadi’s death is good news [for Israel, however], and one can assume that fewer and fewer Arab citizens of Israel will now try to reach Syria and Iraq to fight in Islamic State’s ranks. Even so, IS underground activity in Europe is unlikely to cease. It may even be bolstered by the announcement of a new leader to replace Baghdadi and inspired by the myths created among jihadists around the world following his death.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Al Qaeda, ISIS, Syrian civil war, U.S. Foreign policy

 

How America Sowed the Seeds of the Current Middle East Crisis in 2015

Analyzing the recent direct Iranian attack on Israel, and Israel’s security situation more generally, Michael Oren looks to the 2015 agreement to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. That, and President Biden’s efforts to resurrect the deal after Donald Trump left it, are in his view the source of the current crisis:

Of the original motivations for the deal—blocking Iran’s path to the bomb and transforming Iran into a peaceful nation—neither remained. All Biden was left with was the ability to kick the can down the road and to uphold Barack Obama’s singular foreign-policy achievement.

In order to achieve that result, the administration has repeatedly refused to punish Iran for its malign actions:

Historians will survey this inexplicable record and wonder how the United States not only allowed Iran repeatedly to assault its citizens, soldiers, and allies but consistently rewarded it for doing so. They may well conclude that in a desperate effort to avoid getting dragged into a regional Middle Eastern war, the U.S. might well have precipitated one.

While America’s friends in the Middle East, especially Israel, have every reason to feel grateful for the vital assistance they received in intercepting Iran’s missile and drone onslaught, they might also ask what the U.S. can now do differently to deter Iran from further aggression. . . . Tehran will see this weekend’s direct attack on Israel as a victory—their own—for their ability to continue threatening Israel and destabilizing the Middle East with impunity.

Israel, of course, must respond differently. Our target cannot simply be the Iranian proxies that surround our country and that have waged war on us since October 7, but, as the Saudis call it, “the head of the snake.”

Read more at Free Press

More about: Barack Obama, Gaza War 2023, Iran, Iran nuclear deal, U.S. Foreign policy