Three weeks since Israel’s do-over election, it remains unclear who the next prime minister will be. Coalition negotiations could go on for weeks more, and a third round of elections remains a possibility. David M. Weinberg argues that this long state of political uncertainty, which has been in effect since the first elections in April, has a deleterious effect on Israeli security:

The main reason that Israel has been able to avoid significant, full-scale war over the past decade, despite [numerous] threats, . . . has been the assessment in global capitals that Israel is skillfully and defiantly led by a strong leader. Whether they liked Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or not, allies and adversaries knew that they faced formidable and determined Israeli leadership.

But this state of affairs—what amounts to Israel’s deterrence posture—requires constant care. Deterrence needs to be compellingly and consistently maintained or it loses its cogency. Like any agricultural field, it needs regular plowing, seeding, and especially weeding if it is going to yield a harvest. Israel will be hard-pressed to maintain this deterrent posture if the political stalemate lingers for too much longer. Israel’s strategic situation doesn’t brook inertia. Israel simply can’t afford an endless leadership limbo.

Prolonged political uncertainty poses two different dangers: that Israel’s enemies will be tempted to take advantage of Israel’s infirmity, and that Israel will be unable to take advantage of emerging diplomatic opportunities. It’s obvious that security tensions are bubbling very close to the surface, both from Hamas in Gaza and from Iranian forces in Lebanon and Syria. . . . The hot situation in the Persian Gulf could erupt into regional war, too, and Israel may be implicated. This reality requires stable government and probably a unity government.

Consider this, too: a new Israeli government that does not include Netanyahu in some way may be forced to fight several fierce wars to re-prove Israel’s mettle.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.