With his Yisrael Beytenu party controlling eight of the Knesset’s 120 seats, Avigdor Liberman could play a major role in determining which of the front runners in the last election will become prime minister. Last weekend he offered them an ultimatum: either the two form a unity government without the Arab parties, which Yisrael Beytenu will then join, or Lieberman will throw his support behind whichever party leader is willing to compromise. Lahav Harkov notes that this creates a version of the prisoner’s dilemma, where two prisoners, held separately, can obtain the most by refusing to cooperate with the police, but each can mitigate potential punishment by providing evidence against the other:

For Gantz to accept Liberman’s terms, he would likely have to break his campaign promise not to sit in a government led by a prime minister under indictment [as Netanyahu almost certainly will be].

For Netanyahu, accepting Liberman’s game plan could mean he ends up with nothing. If Netanyahu agrees to give up on the other right-wing parties in his bloc [in order to compromise with Blue and White], then some or all of them could give up on him. Which means that even if Gantz refuses to compromise and Netanyahu agrees, Gantz could still win [because Netanyahu will be left without sufficient support to form a government]. Netanyahu does not have that alternative possibility, because if he does not compromise, Liberman has said in that case he won’t join him, and the left-wing parties have promised not to be in any government with Netanyahu.

There’s a dilemma here for Liberman as well. If one side compromises and the other doesn’t, no matter which side it is, Liberman will have to renege blatantly on his own promises. Liberman pledged not to join a coalition with the ḥaredi parties unless they make major compromises that are anathema to them—which means that if he supports Netanyahu, the only path to a government involves his going back on his word. If Liberman ends up supporting Gantz, the only practical option at the moment is for the Blue and White leader to form a minority government [also] supported by the Arab Joint List, [which Liberman has consistently insisted should be left out of the government].

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.