The ostensible reason Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired hundreds of rockets at Israel this week was the IDF’s assassination of one of its senior commanders, Abu al-Atah—itself a response to a Palestinian rocket barrage a few days beforehand. To Michael Koplow, the killing of Atah was intended to send a direct message to Tehran:

More than any other [country], the Israeli government has naturally been concerned about Iran’s aggressive posture, and Israel needs to take action that will not only disrupt Iran but will send a message of deterrence. For the past two years, Israel’s mechanism for doing this has been repeated strikes on Iranian weapons and proxies in Syria, but that avenue has recently become more complicated. Not only does it risk a rupture with Russia, Israel appears to have calculated that it may risk a direct conflict with Iran. When Hizballah fired anti-aircraft missiles at an Israeli drone last week and Israel let the incident go without destroying the launchers, it was the clearest sign that the rules of the game in Syria have changed to Israel’s detriment.

Killing Abu al-Atah is one way for Israel to deal with the new regional balance outside of the Syrian theater. Islamic Jihad is Iran’s closest proxy in Gaza: it is financed, armed, and directed by the Islamic Republic. Its Iranian sponsorship explains why, despite its relative paucity in size compared to Hamas, it is better funded and by most estimates controls a rocket arsenal of equal numbers. Taking out its military commander in Gaza is the closest Israel can come to hitting Iran directly, and while PIJ does not have the ability to threaten Israel in the same manner as do Iranian proxies in Syria and Lebanon, targeting Abu al-Atah was the best move available to Israel if it wants to exercise greater caution in Syria. Aside from potentially making southern Israel a bit quieter going forward, this was intended to give Iran pause.

[Moreover], the strike on Islamic Jihad was intended to . . . test Hamas. . . . In the past, Israel has hit Hamas targets in response to rockets from Gaza irrespective of which entity has done the firing, on the theory that Hamas is the sovereign in Gaza and is responsible for everything that happens there. This time, Israel is consciously doing things differently and it is not coincidental. . . . If Hamas indeed continues to refrain from responding to Israeli actions in Gaza targeting Islamic Jihad, it will go toward confirming the theory of daylight between the two groups, and will drive Israeli assumptions about Gaza going forward.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.