When the State Department announced yesterday that it no longer regards Israeli settlements outside of the 1949 armistice lines as illegal, it went not only against the opinion of the Carter administration but against a view widely held by journalists, policy analysts, and governments the world over. Yet, like other widely held beliefs, this one is incorrect. Alan Baker explains why it has no basis in international law:

With regard to the West Bank areas [seized by Israel from Jordan during the Six-Day War], the legal situation was not a classical case of the belligerent occupation of the land of a sovereign state. This irregularity stemmed from the fact that Jordan was not considered by the international community as having attained legitimate sovereign rights over the areas of Judea and Samaria. . . . As such, from the legal point of view, since there existed no legitimate sovereign power, a sui-generis situation existed in which the classic laws of occupation were not legally applicable.

Pursuant to Article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations dealing with the issue of property, Israel, as “administrator and usufructuary,” maintained the right to use public, non-privately-owned land and property, pending the final outcome of the dispute. This premise served as the basis for Israel’s settlement policy, enabling use of public lands and properties while strictly respecting private rights of ownership of local residents of the territories.

Israel has consistently rejected the oft-heard accusation in international political bodies that its settlement policy violates the Fourth Geneva Convention’s prohibition on the mass transfer of its residents into the territory. This [clause was drafted] in light of Nazis’ mass transfers of populations in Europe in an attempt to alter the demographic structure of the countries involved. This was made clear in the official Red Cross commentary . . . on the sixth paragraph of the Geneva Convention article 49.

Moreover, Baker explains, the 1995 Oslo 2 agreement—a treaty undoubtedly legitimate as a matter of international law—created a special and unique legal status for the West Bank. The treaty assigns to Jerusalem control over Area C of the territory, and over the Israeli citizens and Palestinians who live there. As all of the settlements are located in Area C, there should be little doubt that Israel can regulate the construction of housing there as it sees fit.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.