In the Jewish state’s latest round of fighting with Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas sat out the conflict almost entirely, and the IDF—with only a few exceptions in the final rounds—struck exclusively at Islamic Jihad targets. By deterring Hamas, writes Hillel Frisch, Jerusalem may have also succeeded in driving a wedge between it and Islamic Jihad, which, like the divide between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, could work to Israel’s advantage. Frisch probes the benefits, and the limits, of this divide-but-don’t-conquer strategy:

There are two possible solutions to the violence emanating from Gaza. Either embark on a massive fourth round of conflict like the 2014 confrontation and hope that it will bring Hamas to non-belligerency . . . or adhere to the “taming Hamas” approach used by Netanyahu since [the border riots known as] “the March of Return” began at the end of March 2018, which minimizes the sticks and maximizes the “carrots” for keeping the peace.

Initiating a massive round [of fighting], including a ground offensive into Gaza, . . . plays into the hands of Tehran’s regional strategy to use the Palestinian card to deflect the focus from its buildup in Syria, and entails other obvious costs in terms of lives and treasure. . . . The costs of [the latter] strategy are equally obvious. Any carrots offered to Hamas might buy peace and ameliorate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, but Hamas will use those same carrots to enhance its military capabilities.

Just as Israel “tamed” the PA—in part because after 2007, [both] faced a shared enemy in Hamas and Islamic Jihad—giving rise to unprecedented levels of security cooperation between the two, Israel and Hamas are cementing a mutual interest in weakening Islamic Jihad.

As auspicious as this wedge in Islamist ranks may be, however, . . . Israel should give the fewest carrots and concessions possible, knowing full well that some of these carrots are quickly converted into firepower to be used against Israel in the future. This also means scuttling the visions promoted by Benny Gantz and [some Israeli analysts] who argue that Israeli sticks should be accompanied by a Marshall Plan of goodies to improve the welfare of Gaza’s inhabitants. That only worked after Germany and Japan were totally defeated and a mutual threat to the Western alliance, the Soviet Union, emerged.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.