For much of American Jewry, local Jewish federations remain important umbrella organizations that direct funds to a variety of Jewish philanthropies. But the New Israel Fund (NIF)—founded in 1979 to support left-wing organizations in the Jewish state—has recently taken the step of trying to compete with the federations in distributing monies, particularly through donor-advised funds. NIF’s supposed advantage is that it is happy to direct donations to anti-Israel groups such as IfNotNow, deemed off-limits by federations. Jonathan Tobin writes:

By taking money away from the federation’s charitable funds in this manner, [NIF] will drastically reduce already diminishing resources in an era of shrinking Jewish demographics and donations. What’s worse, . . . it’s an effort to destroy the links between American Jews and Israel.

The worst thing federations could do in response to the NIF’s efforts would be to seek to compete with them by opening themselves up to donors who want to direct money to anti-Israel groups.

[I]nclusion cannot be the primary goal of any Jewish community. A community that funds Jewish and Zionist philanthropies while also giving donors an option to back anti-Zionist . . . efforts that seek to hurt Israel is one that isn’t so much inclusive as one that stands for nothing. And communities that stand for nothing have no purpose or chance of survival.

The best response to this challenge is for federations to stand firm against this disreputable effort not only to damage Israel but to impact the ability of these philanthropies to fund the infrastructure of Jewish life—namely, schools, camps, adult-education and vocational assistance, services to the elderly and poor, and aid to overseas Jewish causes. . . . This is a moment when those who care about Israel—no matter where you stand on the ideological spectrum—must draw a line and demand that Jewish philanthropies continue to say “no” to anti-Zionist groups.

Concluded in 1979, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty ended nearly 30 years of intermittent warfare, and proved one of the most enduring and beneficial products of Middle East diplomacy. But Egypt may not have been upholding its end of the bargain, write Jonathan Schanzer and Mariam Wahba:

Article III, subsection two of the peace agreement’s preamble explicitly requires both parties “to ensure that that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory.” This clause also mandates both parties to hold accountable any perpetrators of such acts.

Recent Israeli operations along the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow strip of land bordering Egypt and Gaza, have uncovered multiple tunnels and access points used by Hamas—some in plain sight of Egyptian guard towers. While it could be argued that Egypt has lacked the capacity to tackle this problem, it is equally plausible that it lacks the will. Either way, it’s a serious problem.

Was Egypt motivated by money, amidst a steep and protracted economic decline in recent years? Did Cairo get paid off by Hamas, or its wealthy patron, Qatar? Did the Iranians play a role? Was Egypt threatened with violence and unrest by the Sinai’s Bedouin Union of Tribes, who are the primary profiteers of smuggling, if it did not allow the tunnels to operate? Or did the Sisi regime take part in this operation because of an ideological hatred of Israel?