Yesterday the head of the UN Relief Works Agency (UNRWA)—created in 1949 to provide humanitarian relief to Arab refugees from Israel’s War of Independence—resigned amidst a corruption scandal involving misuse of funds and an affair with a subordinate. As Frank Musmar notes, corruption is but one of many problems with the organization, which caters not just to refugees but to their descendants and, contrary to its original mission, seeks not to settle them in the countries where they live but to keep them in a perpetual state of dependency. He writes:

UNRWA has prolonged rather than resolved the plight of Palestinian refugees. Worse, by encouraging the Palestinian fixation on the “right of return”—the standard euphemism for the destruction of Israel via demographic subversion—it impedes negotiations for a permanent peace agreement. The agency should be eliminated and the responsibility for [the remaining] Palestinian refugees shifted to the UN high commissioner of refugees (UNHCR).

Not for the first time, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services is currently investigating UNRWA’s top management for abuses of power, including sexual misconduct, nepotism, bullying, and retaliation. The Swiss, Dutch, and Belgian governments have all suspended payments to UNRWA while the investigation is ongoing.

Perhaps not surprisingly in view of the above, the agency has adopted a culture of secrecy about itself. It employs about 30,000 people—compared with the 11,000 employees of UNHCR [the UN’s main agency for refugees] for the rest of the world’s 17 million refugees and displaced persons. Most of its staff are Palestinians and many are known members of Hamas; indeed, Hamas membership can help one get a UN job on the West Bank.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.