On November 1, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), an Iran-backed terrorist group based in the Gaza Strip, launched a barrage of rockets at nearby towns in Israel. The IDF responded by striking military targets in the Strip and, yesterday, in the wee hours of the morning, killed Baha Abu al-Ata, one of PIJ’s senior commanders. The terrorist group responded by launching some 200 rockets over the course of the day, sending Israelis to bomb shelters not just in the immediate vicinity of Gaza but also in the center of the country and as far north as Tel Aviv. Khaled Abu Toameh analyzes the political calculations of both PIJ and Hamas:

Hamas [seems] very cautious in its response to the assassination. By Tuesday afternoon, it remained unclear whether Hamas has officially joined PIJ and other groups in firing rockets at Israel. Hamas is reluctant to engage in a new war with Israel because it knows that would mean the end of its rule.

In recent months, Ata was among PIJ leaders who visited Cairo a number of times for talks with Egyptian intelligence officials on ways of preserving ceasefire understandings reached between Israel and the Gaza-based Palestinian factions earlier this year under Egyptian auspices. The invitation to Cairo came after the Egyptians realized that PIJ and its patrons in Tehran were not too pleased with the ceasefire understandings.

The PIJ leaders are reported to have told the Egyptians that their group is not interested in an all-out military confrontation with Israel, at least not at this stage. [Instead] their group has decided to endorse a strategy of “engaging the enemy” [by] pursuing sporadic terror attacks in order to keep Israel “busy” and show that PIJ is not part of any ceasefire understandings.

PIJ is one of the few groups in the Gaza Strip that does not hesitate to challenge Hamas openly or to disagree with it on crucial issues. . . . The assassination of Abu al-Ata puts Hamas in a difficult situation. On the one hand, the last thing Hamas leaders want is to be seen preventing Palestinians from launching rockets at Israel to avenge the killing of a top military officer. On the other hand, the assessment among Palestinians yesterday afternoon is that Hamas will not allow PIJ to drag the Gaza Strip into a military adventure with Israel. Hamas’s leaders, Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, are also aware that the IDF is capable of making them meet the same fate as Abu al-Ata should Hamas join the PIJ rocket attacks on Israel.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.