Last week the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that any foodstuffs produced by Jews or Jewish-owned businesses in areas of Israel outside the 1949 armistice lines must be labeled as such. The legal decision renders binding an advisory ruling issued by the European Commission in 2015. Caroline Glick comments on the latest ruling, which, she notes, emanates from a group of countries that insist they are “friends” of the Jewish state:

Israel . . . never stood a chance of getting justice at the ECJ. . . . For decades, the EU has been waging a hostile campaign against Israel. The goals of its campaign are to call Israel’s right to exist into question, weaken Israel economically and politically, and strengthen Israel’s enemies at Israel’s expense. The EU wages its campaign through political, diplomatic, and economic warfare. . . . At the UN, EU member states vote against Israel and for its enemies as a general practice. . . . The EU leverages its trade and scientific cooperation with Israel to normalize boycotts of Israeli companies, institutions, and Jewish citizens who operate beyond the 1949 armistice lines.

An attorney who argued against the labeling policy before the ECJ commented that the ruling sets a destructive precedent, whereby any political pressure group will be able to demand that the EU mandate special labeling practices on any products from anywhere. But, writes Glick, this argument is hopelessly naïve:

The verdict—like the EU’s legally unsupported claim that Israeli “settlements” built beyond the 1949 armistice lines are illegal—is not general. It is very specific. It applies only to Israel. The ECJ’s ruling will not be applied on behalf of vegans or Tibetans. Everyone knows it was directed against Israel and its Jewish citizens alone. The verdict was political, not legal.

In their contacts with the EU, its agencies, and its aligned organizations, [Israeli] government officials likewise act on the basis of the mistaken belief that it is possible to convince the Europeans to abandon their hostile positions against Israel through reasoning and evidence. Perhaps the best example of this misguided Israeli practice is the respect Israel accords the prosecutors at the International Criminal Court (ICC).

ICC investigators are currently preparing charges against Israelis for so-called war crimes on the basis of false accusations submitted by the Palestinians. . . . Israel continues its dialogue with the ICC prosecutor and permits the prosecutor’s representatives to enter Israel in the hopes of convincing it of Israel’s innocence. But the fact the ICC is even giving a hearing to, let along proceeding with, its investigations of false accusations against Israel is proof that it is a hostile body. It will never give a fair hearing to Israel.

It is also time for Israel to act in the legal arena in jurisdictions that are not inherently hostile to the Jewish state.

If there’s one lesson to be learned from the history of the Israel-Arab conflict, it’s never to be confident that an end is in sight. Ehud Yaari nevertheless—and with all due caution—points to some noteworthy developments:

The absolute primacy of “armed struggle” in Palestinian discourse has discouraged any serious attempt to discuss or plan for a future Palestinian state. Palestinian political literature is devoid of any substantial debate over what kind of a state they aspire to create. What would be its economic, foreign, and social policies?

One significant exception was a seminar held by Hamas in Gaza—under the auspices of the late Yahya Sinwar—prior to October 7, 2023. The main focus of what was described as a brainstorming session was the question of how to deal with the Jews in the land to be liberated. A broad consensus between the participants was reached that most Israeli Jews should be eradicated or expelled while those contributing to Israel’s success in high tech and other critical domains would be forced to serve the new Palestinian authorities.

Yet, the ongoing aftershocks from the ongoing war in Gaza are posing questions among Palestinians concerning the viability of armed struggle. So far this trend is reflected mainly in stormy exchanges on social-media platforms and internal controversies within Hamas. There is mounting criticism leveled at the late Mohammad Deif and Yahya Sinwar for embarking upon an uncoordinated offensive that is resulting in a “Second Nakba”—a repeat of the defeat and mass displacement caused by launching the war in 1948.

To be sure, “armed struggle” is still being preached daily to the Palestinian communities by Iran and Iranian proxies, and at least half the Palestinian public—according to various polls—believe it remains indispensable. But doubts are being heard. We may be reaching a point where the Palestinians will feel compelled to make a choice between the road which led to past failures and an attempt to chart a new route. It will certainly require time and is bound to cause fractures and divisions, perhaps even a violent split, among the Palestinians.