Israel’s Iron Dome Works—for Now

Dec. 24 2019

When terrorists in Gaza fired some 450 rockets at Israel last month, the Iron Dome anti-missile system kept the damage to a bare minimum, intercepting at least 86 percent of the incoming projectiles. But it would be both more difficult and more expensive to maintain such a success rate if Hamas and Islamic Jihad were to succeed in upgrading their missiles with precision-guidance technology. The consequences would be even worse if these groups were joined by the various Iran-backed guerrillas in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, at least some of whom already have such weapons. Jonathan Schanzer writes:

[W]ith enough precision guided missiles (PGMs) fired at the same target, Iran’s proxies may be able to outmaneuver, outsmart, or overwhelm Israeli missile-defense systems, with the result that one or more rockets would get through. Hamas already claims to be able to do this with its unguided rockets. Such claims are dubious now. But in the future, if the intended target is the chemical plant in Haifa, the Kiryah (Israel’s defense headquarters) in Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion International Airport, or a Tel Aviv office building, the results could be catastrophic.

Israel’s military brass would much rather destroy PGMs on the ground than intercept them in the air. One problem they have is patrolling the vast territory Iran controls to build, store, and launch its munitions.

With PGMs, the era of Iron Dome’s total dominance may come to an end. This does not mean that the Israelis will stop using this remarkable system to protect its citizens from incoming rockets. But barring significant improvements to counter PGMs, Iron Dome may no longer provide the Israeli leadership with the luxury of time to weigh their options when they must respond to a hailstorm of precision strikes.

Should PGMs pierce Israel’s defenses and hit more of the intended targets, the Israeli public will demand a response. The political and military leadership will be forced to respond more rapidly and with greater force. This will increase the odds of mistakes on the battlefield and thus the odds of escalation. And if PGMs are fired from multiple locations, the natural result will be a multifront war.

Read more at Commentary

More about: Hamas, Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security

In an Effort at Reform, Mahmoud Abbas Names an Ex-Terrorist His Deputy President

April 28 2025

When he called upon Hamas to end the war and release the hostages last week, the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was also getting ready for a reshuffle within his regime. On Saturday, he appointed Hussein al-Sheikh deputy president of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is intimately tied to the PA itself. Al-Sheikh would therefore succeed Abbas—who is eighty-nine and reportedly in ill health—as head of the PLO if he should die or become incapacitated, and be positioned to succeed him as head of the PA as well.

Al-Sheikh spent eleven years in an Israeli prison and, writes Maurice Hirsch, was involved in planning a 2002 Jerusalem suicide bombing that killed three. Moreover, Hirsch writes, he “does not enjoy broad Palestinian popularity or support.”

Still, by appointing Al-Sheikh, Abbas has taken a step in the internal reforms he inaugurated last year in the hope that he could prove to the Biden administration and other relevant players that the PA was up to the task of governing the Gaza Strip. Neomi Neumann writes:

Abbas’s motivation for reform also appears rooted in the need to meet the expectations of Arab and European donors without compromising his authority. On April 14, the EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas approved a three-year aid package worth 1.6 billion euros, including 620 million euros in direct budget support tied to reforms. Meanwhile, the French president Emmanuel Macron held a call with Abbas [earlier this month] and noted afterward that reforms are essential for the PA to be seen as a viable governing authority for Gaza—a telling remark given reports that Paris may soon recognize “the state of Palestine.”

In some cases, reforms appear targeted at specific regional partners. The idea of appointing a vice-president originated with Saudi Arabia.

In the near term, Abbas’s main goal appears to be preserving Arab and European support ahead of a major international conference in New York this June.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Mahmoud Abbas, Palestinian Authority, PLO