After weeks of negotiations, the members of the Knesset again failed to form a governing coalition ahead of the legal deadline, which means that Israelis will go to the polls yet again in March—marking the third national election in less than twelve months. The consequences, write David Horovitz, are serious:

The sheer cost of these repeat votes is embarrassing—tens of millions of shekels (spent) each time just on election propaganda; two days off work nationwide in April and September and possibly another in March, unless they decide we’ve had enough national election holidays; and a staggering total of almost $3 billion for all the combined direct and indirect costs of the three elections. And, oh, how we could do without the weeks and weeks of more political infighting on the campaign trail—the bitching, and the spinning, and the demonizing of left and right, ultra-Orthodox and secular, Arab and Jew.

Certainly there is more than enough blame to go around, argues Horovitz, upbraiding most of the major political players for their mistakes. But he also believes there is room for hope:

Rather than looking at round three of elections as proof of the system’s failure and paralysis, perhaps it is enabling the electorate to work through the hugely sensitive decision of who should lead this country, and thus how and where it should be led, a little more protractedly than is the norm. Perhaps our system is actually working for us rather than against us. . . . Our politicians have been tested twice, we’re about to test them again, and that might just enable us to make a more definitive decision.

[Israel’s] electorate, [political] system, and politicians have combined to force a third election in less than a year. We might not like it, but ultimately, we chose it; we did it to ourselves. Election Three is our creation. And maybe . . . we’ll finally manage to make up our collective mind.

If there’s one lesson to be learned from the history of the Israel-Arab conflict, it’s never to be confident that an end is in sight. Ehud Yaari nevertheless—and with all due caution—points to some noteworthy developments:

The absolute primacy of “armed struggle” in Palestinian discourse has discouraged any serious attempt to discuss or plan for a future Palestinian state. Palestinian political literature is devoid of any substantial debate over what kind of a state they aspire to create. What would be its economic, foreign, and social policies?

One significant exception was a seminar held by Hamas in Gaza—under the auspices of the late Yahya Sinwar—prior to October 7, 2023. The main focus of what was described as a brainstorming session was the question of how to deal with the Jews in the land to be liberated. A broad consensus between the participants was reached that most Israeli Jews should be eradicated or expelled while those contributing to Israel’s success in high tech and other critical domains would be forced to serve the new Palestinian authorities.

Yet, the ongoing aftershocks from the ongoing war in Gaza are posing questions among Palestinians concerning the viability of armed struggle. So far this trend is reflected mainly in stormy exchanges on social-media platforms and internal controversies within Hamas. There is mounting criticism leveled at the late Mohammad Deif and Yahya Sinwar for embarking upon an uncoordinated offensive that is resulting in a “Second Nakba”—a repeat of the defeat and mass displacement caused by launching the war in 1948.

To be sure, “armed struggle” is still being preached daily to the Palestinian communities by Iran and Iranian proxies, and at least half the Palestinian public—according to various polls—believe it remains indispensable. But doubts are being heard. We may be reaching a point where the Palestinians will feel compelled to make a choice between the road which led to past failures and an attempt to chart a new route. It will certainly require time and is bound to cause fractures and divisions, perhaps even a violent split, among the Palestinians.