After weeks of negotiations, the members of the Knesset again failed to form a governing coalition ahead of the legal deadline, which means that Israelis will go to the polls yet again in March—marking the third national election in less than twelve months. The consequences, write David Horovitz, are serious:

The sheer cost of these repeat votes is embarrassing—tens of millions of shekels (spent) each time just on election propaganda; two days off work nationwide in April and September and possibly another in March, unless they decide we’ve had enough national election holidays; and a staggering total of almost $3 billion for all the combined direct and indirect costs of the three elections. And, oh, how we could do without the weeks and weeks of more political infighting on the campaign trail—the bitching, and the spinning, and the demonizing of left and right, ultra-Orthodox and secular, Arab and Jew.

Certainly there is more than enough blame to go around, argues Horovitz, upbraiding most of the major political players for their mistakes. But he also believes there is room for hope:

Rather than looking at round three of elections as proof of the system’s failure and paralysis, perhaps it is enabling the electorate to work through the hugely sensitive decision of who should lead this country, and thus how and where it should be led, a little more protractedly than is the norm. Perhaps our system is actually working for us rather than against us. . . . Our politicians have been tested twice, we’re about to test them again, and that might just enable us to make a more definitive decision.

[Israel’s] electorate, [political] system, and politicians have combined to force a third election in less than a year. We might not like it, but ultimately, we chose it; we did it to ourselves. Election Three is our creation. And maybe . . . we’ll finally manage to make up our collective mind.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.