Outside of the U.S., Israel leads the world in the extent to which its companies have attracted venture capital, and it has made good on these investments. Reuven Brenner, reviewing a recent book on the history of venture capital in America, argues that, in both countries, the factors behind this success are almost impossible to replicate elsewhere:

Between 1991 and 2000, Israel’s annual venture-capital outlays rose from $58 million to $3.3 billion; the number of companies launched went from 100 to 800; and revenues of the new technology sector rose from $1.6 billion to $12.5 billion. Migration played an important role. Among the one million Russian immigrants in the early 1990s (a 20-percent increase in the nation’s population), more than 55 percent had post-secondary education; 15 percent were engineers and architects; 7 percent were physicians; 18 percent were technicians and other professionals. By 1998, Israel had 140 scientists and engineers per 10,000 in its labor force, becoming the world leader in these terms, followed by the United States with 80, and Germany with 55.

Israel’s culture was, furthermore, like that of Silicon Valley—due to virtues and habits associated with military service, which is compulsory in the country. It added crucial components of “education,” namely, discipline and loyalty. A characteristic feature of many (perhaps most) of the successful Israeli companies is that their founders served together in the Israeli army. A unit within the intelligence corps, responsible for collecting signal intelligence decrypting codes, is one example. The founders of Nice, Comverse, Stylit, and Outbrain all emerged from this unit.

The big problem for start-ups and funders of venture-capital firms is finding the team that can bring ideas to life. Team members must trust one another. They must know how the skills of each complement those of the rest. Who has leadership skills? Who is the techie “nerd”? Who has managerial, negotiating skills? Who is good at dealing with stress? Who is the better listener?

In Israel, the military happens to be the best training ground to answer these questions. Also, soldiers higher in the military hierarchy have been subordinates outside it, and, when serving in the reserves, higher-ranked employees were under the command of lower-ranked ones in the business. The result is a casual fluidity in communication within teams that helps an enterprise succeed.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.