Reconciliation between Qatar and Its Gulf Neighbors Is Possible, but Would It Be Good for Israel? https://mosaicmagazine.com/picks/israel-zionism/2019/12/reconciliation-between-qatar-and-its-gulf-neighbors-is-possible-but-would-it-be-good-for-israel/

December 17, 2019 | Joshua Krasna
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In 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and seven other Muslim countries imposed an embargo on Qatar, angered by its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and its unwillingness to close ranks in opposing Iranian expansionism. Yet last month the Saudi king hosted the Qatari prime minister in Riyadh. Joshua Krasna notes this as but one of many signals that both sides are interested in easing tensions, and discusses what such a thaw might imply for the Jewish state:

From Israel’s point of view, a possible rapprochement is a mixed bag. Israel has reasonable relations with almost all of the Gulf Cooperation Council states (with the notable exception of anti-Israel Kuwait), and an easing of the blockade of Qatar will probably facilitate Israeli business and covert diplomatic activity in the region. It may also lead over time to an attenuation of the alliance between Doha and Turkey, which, while it is not Israel’s main rival in the region, is certainly a secondary one so long as Erdogan is at the helm. [Reconciliation] may perhaps curtail Ankara’s efforts to extend its regional reach, to entrench itself in the Gulf, and to embroil itself in every regional conflict.

A return by Qatar to the Arab fold may well be predicated, even if not formally, on a lessening of its support for radical elements in the region, including Hamas (as part of the Muslim Brotherhood), a development that has both positive and negative repercussions for Israel.

The divided Gulf has . . . pushed Qatar, and ostensible neutrals Oman and Kuwait, closer to Iran. [Yet] a divided Arab world has also afforded Israel more opportunities for shared interests with various players, and for leveraging ties with one side to improve ties with another. . . . To the extent that the rapprochement among the Gulf states indicates a possible inclination towards relaxing tensions with Iran, . . . it may threaten Israel’s anti-Iranian regional alignment.

This, coupled with the perceived American disinclination to back up its robust declaratory policy on Iran with military measures (and the not unimaginable possibility that President Trump may yet engage with Iran, as he hinted again after the recent prisoner exchange), could mean a net loss of Israeli leverage and deterrence vis-à-vis Iran. It could also roll back some of the significant diplomatic gains Israel has had in recent years in its relations with the Gulf states, who seem to need Israel more than they dislike it.

Read more on Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security: https://jiss.org.il/en/krasna-signs-of-partial-thaw-in-intra-sunni-cold-war/