Slowly, Arab Attitudes toward Israel Are Changing

Dec. 19 2019

In the 1960s, what Ed Husain calls an “anti-Semitic craze to destroy Israel” was at its height, a force so strong that Gamal Abdel Nasser could use it to unite the fractious Arab states behind him. Now, many years later, it has begun to dissipate, and a new, somewhat more positive attitude toward the Jewish state has begun to emerge not only among rulers eager for allies in confronting Iran, but also among segments of the populace:

Polls show that the percentage of Arabs expressing trust in Islamist parties has fallen by well over a third since the uprisings of 2011. Three-quarters of Iraqis say they do not trust Islamist parties at all, and the number of young people who say they’re “not religious” is also on the rise. This generation wants Arab leaders to increase economic prosperity and minimize political conflicts. And to build alliances, including with Israel. . . .

I’ve noticed a change of mood on my own travels. I regularly meet Egyptians and others who desperately want to normalize relations with Israel. [One of the reasons offered most often is that] the events of the Arab Spring exposed the fanaticism of the Muslim Brotherhood and other related Islamist groups, with the hardliners now being viewed as a threat to both Islam as a faith and Muslims as a people. Islamic State, and other “Islamic states” are, of course, the logical outcome of Islamism. Now that this creed has been tested to destruction, it is being seen for what it is—and rejected. . . .

Israel is [also] seen by moderate Arab governments as a trade and security partner as the West sends mixed signals. Barack Obama abandoned his Arab allies when they faced threats from the Muslim Brotherhood or Iran. . . . This lesson in unreliability has not been forgotten.

“Of course,” Husain adds, “there is a lot of history to overcome.” Just a few days ago, in fact, Saudi Arabia—whose ever-closer relations with Israel have become an open secret—revoked the citizenship of a vocally pro-Israel journalist for unspecified reasons.

Read more at Spectator

More about: Arab anti-Semitism, Iran, Islamism, Israel-Arab relations, Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia

Hamas’s Confidence Shows Why Hostage Talks Aren’t Working

Sept. 10 2024

Yesterday, President Biden reportedly met with his advisers to discuss how to achieve a breakthrough in hostage negotiations. Meir Ben Shabbat takes a closer look at what the terrorists themselves are saying:

Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas’s deputy chief in Gaza, reiterated that this issue is merely one of several demands his group has put forward as conditions for a deal. “We stress that any agreement must encompass a full cessation of hostilities, complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah crossing [which allow Hamas to smuggle weapons and supplies from Egypt], unimpeded return of displaced persons to their homes, aid and relief for Palestinians, Gaza’s reconstruction, and a prisoner exchange,” al-Hayya stated.

This stance isn’t new. What stood out in its presentation was the self-assurance displayed by the senior Hamas official, during a week when he and his associates were expected to be on edge, fearing repercussions for the killing of six hostages. However, the reaction to this in Israel and the United States prompted an opposite response from them. From their perspective, not only did they avoid consequences for the heinous act, but through it, they managed to escalate tensions and internal disagreements in Israel, while also prompting Washington to consider presenting a framework defined as a “final offer, without room for negotiation.

Hamas assumes that a final American proposal will inevitably come at Israel’s expense. The primary pressure to reach an agreement is already being applied to Israeli leadership. Hamas faces no consequences for prolonging the process, and so long as it holds hostages, it can always resume negotiations from where they left off.

Read more at Israel Hayom

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, U.S. Foreign policy