Benjamin Netanyahu has more than once said that, if given another term as prime minister, he would apply Israeli law to the Jordan Valley—raising a predictable hue and cry. Responding to those among Netanyahu’s critics who argue that this area must inevitably be part of a future Palestinian state, Amir Avivi writes:

The Jordan River border is over 180 miles long and can be crossed at any point. The Palestinians would be able to exercise the “right of return” and bring into the heart of Israel hundreds of thousands of terrorists from all around the Middle East, with an endless number of weapons, posing an existential threat to the . . . low plains of central Israel. In Gaza the same ideas resulted in the takeover by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. . . . All the weapons in Gaza are smuggled through a seven-mile border with Egypt through tunnels. To reverse [the Gaza withdrawal alone] would mean a war with thousands of casualties.

[There are those who claim that] Israel applying sovereignty over the Jordan Valley . . . will undermine security cooperation with Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. The same threats were made when President Donald Trump moved the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, but none of these predictions came true for a very simple reason. Both Jordan and the Palestinian Authority depend on the security cooperation with Israel for their survival. They need this cooperation more than Israel does. So, it would be reasonable to assume that nothing dramatic will occur after Israel applies sovereignty over the Jordan Valley.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.