Israel Must Call More Attention to Hizballah’s Failure to Comply with the 2006 Cease-Fire

At the end of the five-week war in 2006 between Israel and Hizballah, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1701 with the aim of keeping both parties out of southern Lebanon; the resolution also created a peacekeeping force, known as UNIFIL, to enforce its terms. As required, in November the United Nations published one of its periodic reports on the situation in southern Lebanon; it was unusually frank about the extent to which Hizballah, with the cooperation of the Lebanese military and government, has been violating the resolution’s terms. Yet the report depicts only the tip of the iceberg, as Assaf Orion writes:

[T]he campaign of harassment of UN forces in southern Lebanon, two incidents of anti-tank-missile launches, the excavation of attack tunnels into Israeli territory that have been in existence for more than a decade, dozens of rocket incidents, four arms depots that exploded, and almost ten explosive-device attacks against UNIFIL and the IDF demonstrate the diversity and abundance of Hizballah’s military presence in southern Lebanon, and its ability to employ it at will. Contrary to the report’s claims, . . . it is blatantly clear that the Lebanese army does nothing against Hizballah’s massive military deployment in southern Lebanon, and subsequently UNIFIL is unable to help it do so.

In response, Orion argues that Jerusalem should do everything it can to document the violations of Resolution 1701 and bring the evidence to the attention of sympathetic governments:

Israel should encourage its Western partners to review their policy toward Lebanon. . . . The economic-political crisis in Lebanon reinforces the state’s dependence on external aid, which can be made conditional on significant progress not only in areas that top the international agenda—reforms, combating corruption, improved governance, and political-economic stability—but also [compliance with Resolution 1701]. The economic crisis likewise reinforces the value to Lebanon of a possible agreement regarding Mediterranean gas, which could be the first step toward a gradual economic-security settlement [with Israel].

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Hizballah, Israeli Security, Lebanon, Second Lebanon War, United Nations

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF