With another election approaching, issues of religion and state have again raised their head, with politicians from the militantly secular Yisrael Beytenu party trading barbs with the Sephardi chief rabbi. The bone of contention relates to the conversion of immigrants from the Soviet Union and their children—many of whom are of only partial Jewish ancestry. Behind such controversies, writes David M. Weinberg, is the ḥaredi takeover of the institutions of the chief rabbinate in the early days of the peace process:

In the 1990s, the political left gave the keys to Israel’s Jewish character to ultra-Orthodox politicians in order to purchase ḥaredi support for the Oslo process and the subsequent Gaza disengagement. Ḥaredi rabbis began a slow but inexorable conquest, with the backing of the reigning Labor party, of city rabbinates, religious courts, conversion courts, municipal religious councils, and kashrut agencies, turning the chief rabbinate into an ossified, contrary force that has created more problems than it has solved.

Religious Zionist and Modern Orthodox rabbis, who had built and controlled the rabbinate for the country’s first 40 years and who were generally much more attuned to the needs of the non-religious and Zionist public, were pushed out. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made the same Faustian bargain in 2013, when, for narrow political reasons, he supported the ḥaredi candidate for chief rabbi, David Lau, over the Religious Zionist candidate, Rabbi David Stav.

As far as most ḥaredi rabbis are concerned, the many Russian non-Jews who came to Israel, and their children, can simply remain Gentiles—since ḥaredi society has no intention of mixing with that public anyway. . . . Religious Zionists feel differently. They generally view the wave of Russian immigration as a blessing from the heavens: a gift from God that imposes a responsibility on rabbinical leaders of this generation to develop solutions so that intermarriage with non-Jews does not become a problem in Israel as it has been in the Diaspora.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.