In November, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish president, signed an agreement with Libya’s official government in Tripoli, with which it shares a pro-Muslim Brotherhood orientation. The agreement recognizes Ankara’s economic rights and control over natural resources as extending deep into the Mediterranean Sea. It thus contradicts the claims of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF)—consisting of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus. Meanwhile, Turkey has also been backing Tripoli militarily in its civil war with the forces of Khalifa Haftar, who has the support of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, and France. Eran Lerman sees in Erdogan’s actions an attempt to push apart the EMGF while expanding his influence in Africa:

Israel’s interests, at this tense time vis-à-vis Iran—and for many other good reasons—require an effort to avoid a violent confrontation in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey may be hostile, but it is not yet an active enemy. Everything short of a military confrontation needs to be done, though, to deter Erdogan from establishing a barrier diagonally across the Mediterranean, barring Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel from connecting their gas infrastructure to Greece and hence to Europe.

While keeping a necessary low profile on Libyan internal affairs, Israel’s role should be focused upon working hand in hand with all EMGF partners, and in particular Greece and Cyprus. The latter have some influence on all three fronts—lobbying in the U.S.; using their EU status; and utilizing the links of common heritage that connect them to Russia.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.