Unlike some previous proposals for the creation of a Palestinian state, the recent U.S. peace plan leaves the easternmost area of the West Bank under Israeli control. This arrangement also strengthens the security of the Kingdom of Jordan, writes Efraim Inbar, which has itself long seen the Palestinian national movement as a threat:

Israel and Jordan share various interests, including support for the American presence in the region, opposing pan-Arab and pan-Islamic movements and, of course, fighting the rise of radical Islam, Sunni or Shiite. Amman also sees eye to eye with Jerusalem on the issue of the Iranian threat. Israel assists Jordan by deterring extremists from threatening it, while Israel, for its part, sees Jordan as a buffer state between it and the extremist entities east of the kingdom.

Jordan is certainly not interested in a neighboring political entity that could develop another Hamas-controlled Gaza. Israeli military control of the Jordan Valley is convenient for Jordan, as it protects Amman from the west.

Since the [two countries] signed a peace agreement in 1994, Jordan’s dependence on Israel has increased. Israel supplies it with increasing quantities of water, far beyond its obligation under the deal, and it also supplies it with natural gas. . . . Moreover, it is hard to imagine that Saudi Arabia, other Persian Gulf countries, or Egypt will go to great lengths to prevent an Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.