Yesterday, terrorists in the Gaza Strip fired a barrage of rockets into Israel, some reaching as far as Ashkelon. For the past several weeks, Gazans have launched dozens of balloon-borne explosives into Israel, and occasionally fired rockets as well, provoking a handful of limited Israeli airstrikes. To Hillel Frisch, the recent attacks show the cracks in Jerusalem’s ongoing understanding with Hamas—negotiated indirectly via Egypt—that has allowed the group to maintain control of Gaza and receive funds from Qatar and elsewhere:

After three-and-a-half years of an almost complete cessation of hostilities following the last beating Hamas took [during the 2014 Gaza war], the policy of [the past two years], by sharp contrast, has brought back the devastating missile trickle or the occasional missile flareup, with the incendiary balloons as icing on the cake, and the lessons couldn’t be clearer.

In fighting an enemy, you do what you do best, and avoid at all costs doing what your enemy does best. Extortion, khuwwa in Arabic, has a long tradition in the way Arabs fight. Israel has a distinguished record at hitting hard, massively, and quickly. It is high time to do what Israel is good at doing rather than engaging with an enemy in what it knows best.

Frisch also calls attention to a recent Hamas press conference in which a spokesperson explained to local reporters in some detail how the organization is disbursing some $78 million recently received from Qatar:

Hamas obviously feels the need to assuage the inhabitants of Gaza. So long as Gaza’s inhabitants think Hamas’s extortion is benefiting them, there is little hope they will serve as an opposition to the organization.

When they realize once again that Hamas policies come at considerable cost—the cost of a massive round of violence—[this calculus] might change, especially since Gaza’s inhabitants have been bearing almost the entire brunt of fighting for the Palestinian cause—as Arab states, Hizballah, and (since Yasir Arafat’s war against Israel in 2000) the Palestinian Authority encourage their sacrifice while they themselves stand as onlookers. It’s time to turn the heat on Hamas for the pain it exerts on Israel.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.