According to a recent survey, only 18 percent of Israelis see the European Union as a friend of their country, while 55 percent view it as an enemy. The EU, which sponsored the study, has now set aside some $300,000 for improving its image in the Jewish state. But so long as Brussels devises anti-Israel policies and funds groups with close ties to Palestinian terrorism, no amount of public-relations efforts will make a difference, writes Liora Henig Cohen:

The EU is completely out of sync with Israelis on the issues that strike the deepest emotional chords, and is seen as tone-deaf, at best, in appreciating the Israeli perspective. . . . Europe flirts with boycotts of [Israel] with product labeling [and issues] repeated condemnations of Israeli policy concerning Area C of the West Bank, as if this were the major issue on the EU’s agenda.

Then there is EU and European funding for organizations that delegitimize Israel, including those that have ties to groups that the EU itself designates terrorist entities. [Just last month], the Shin Bet announced it had uncovered a 50-person terrorist network operated in the West Bank by one of these groups, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The statement named several leading PFLP figures who currently or previously worked for European-funded organizations in financial roles. . . .

Recently, the EU and a handful of countries instituted safeguards meant to prevent funds from reaching terrorist groups, including the EU’s introduction of an anti-terrorist clause in its grant contracts. These measures have been met by strident protests from the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian groups, suggesting that Europeans may waffle if they want to remain popular in Ramallah.

Israelis rightfully wonder if European governments would deal so casually with organizations connected to Islamic State.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.