Given the rapid spread of coronavirus from China to the rest of the globe, and Beijing’s suppression of information about the disease, the U.S. and other nations have begun to rethink the extent to which their economies are entangled with China’s. Israel, which has already responded to Washington’s concerns about its exchanges of technology with China, should lead the way, argue Jacob Nagel and Jonathan Schanzer:

China accounts for roughly 10 to 15 percent of the Israeli economy. Israel relies on China for a wide array of imports. This includes raw materials and food, but also elements of Israel’s automobile, pharmaceutical, construction, and national-infrastructure sectors, to name a few. Chinese components abound in Israeli toys, furniture, jewelry, and more.

There are existing or impending shortages in the aforementioned sectors in Israel. Diversifying trade partners in the Far East and beyond is the only way to ensure this doesn’t happen again. And in doing so, Israel can also assuage its American allies that it is cooling its ties with China. . . . [T]echnological advancements in recent years have blurred the boundaries between defense systems or supervised dual-use systems, [i.e., those that call for special scrutiny because they can be used for civilian or military purposes], and systems with no clear connection to defense. As a result, Israel risks contributing to Chinese technological advances in defense without intending to do so.

As Israel considers reductions in its exposure to China, there will be economists and policymakers who argue that Israel desperately needs Chinese investment and that it cannot be replaced by other countries. They will likely be proven wrong. Israeli tech is coveted by Japan, South Korea, Brazil, India, and European states, to name a few. When the coronavirus crisis has passed, Israel must view them as possible alternatives to Chinese investments and supply chains.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.