Writing under the pseudonym Luqman el-Masry, an Egyptian analyst considers some of his country’s political pathologies, especially with regard to the Jewish state:

Why do we [Egyptians] view Palestinians as friends and Israelis as foes? Why do we have a strategic partnership with the U.S. though the average Egyptian believes, as do most Arabs, that the U.S. is a vile state that conspires with Israel against them? We have a peace treaty with Israel, but so much as to contemplate visiting that country is considered an act of treason.

Conspiracy theories are rife across the Arab world, . . . which enforce the dual notion that the West and Israel are perpetually conspiring against Arabs and that, owing to the West’s perceived support for Israel, there’s not much that can be done about it.

This [fatalism] does Egyptians a great disservice. . . . Consider, for example, the widespread belief among Egyptians in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Instead of working to establish a democratic, healthy community, Egyptians content themselves with the belief that they are hapless victims of a group of sinister [Jews] who held secret meetings to decide their future along with that of the entire world. Why try to shape our country’s future ourselves?

El-Masry hopes that things might change as Egyptians grow increasingly cynical about the failed pan-Arab vision that for so long dominated the country’s politics, and that they will eventually come to appreciate their northern neighbor and ally.

In his speech to the UN General Assembly on Tuesday, Joe Biden addressed a host of international issues, mentioning, inter alia, the “positive and practical impacts” resulting from “Israel’s greater normalization and economic connection with its neighbors.” He then added that the U.S. will “continue to work tirelessly to support a just and lasting peace between the Israelis and Palestinians—two states for two peoples.” Zach Kessel experiences some déjà vu:

Let’s take a stroll down memory lane and review how past U.S.-brokered talks between Jerusalem and [Palestinian leaders] have gone down, starting with 1991’s Madrid Conference, organized by then-President George H.W. Bush. . . . Though the talks, which continued through the next year, didn’t get anywhere concrete, many U.S. officials and observers across the world were heartened by the fact that Madrid was the first time representatives of both sides had met face to face. And then Palestinian militants carried out the first suicide bombing in the history of the conflict.

Then, in 1993, Bill Clinton tried his hand with the Oslo Accords:

In the period of time directly after the Oslo Accords . . . suicide bombings on buses and in crowded public spaces became par for the course. Clinton invited then-Palestinian Authority chairman Yasir Arafat and then-Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak to Camp David in 2000, hoping finally to put the conflict to rest. Arafat, who quite clearly aimed to extract as many concessions as possible from the Israelis without ever intending to agree to any deal—without even putting a counteroffer on the table—scuttled any possibility of peace. Of course, that’s not the most consequential event for the conflict that occurred in 2000. Soon after the Camp David Summit fell apart, the second intifada began.

Since Clinton, each U.S. president has entered office hoping to put together the puzzle that is an outcome acceptable to both sides, and each has failed. . . . Every time a deal has seemed to have legs, something happens—usually terrorist violence—and potential bargains are scrapped. What, then, makes Biden think this time will be any different?