In the past few weeks, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operatives in Gaza have shot at Israeli soldiers, attempted to plant bombs along the border fence, and launched improvised explosives and rockets at Israeli towns and cities. As Yossi Mansharoff explains, PIJ has a long and close relationship with the Islamic Republic, going back to the group’s founder who drew his inspiration from Iran’s theocratic rulers. It is thus no surprise that Islamic Jihad has become Tehran’s main proxy in the Gaza Strip, where its military might is second only to Hamas’s:

Iran began financially assisting [the] organization during the outbreak of the first intifada, if not earlier, and also began to smuggle military equipment to [its operatives] in the West Bank and Gaza. . . . With the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, the organization’s terrorist activity escalated significantly, following a substantial increase in the financial aid provided by Iran. U.S. officials have claimed that Tehran gave PIJ a bonus of millions of dollars for every terrorist attack against Israel. The organization’s leader, Ramadan Shalah, sent his people . . . payments from Iran and instructions regarding the carrying-out of attacks from his headquarters in Damascus.

Despite its attempt to maintain a somewhat independent decision-making process, [today] PIJ is tied to Tehran ideologically, militarily, and financially, so it will find it difficult to deviate from the policy of its Iranian patron. . . . Iran remains PIJ’s only weapons provider and the organization’s sole supporter. [For its part], Iran needs PIJ as a means of maintaining a strategic anchor against Israel, especially in light of its complex relations with Hamas.

While in recent years Israel has been concentrating on preventing Iran’s efforts to establish itself on the northern front, it should at the same time endeavor to curb Iran’s hold on the Gaza Strip. Limiting PIJ’s economic and military capability is a common Israeli and American interest. PIJ was declared a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States in 1997, following the brutal terrorist attacks it perpetrated against Israel with Iranian support, in which American citizens were also killed, and after senior PIJ officials established themselves on U.S. soil and the organization carried out fundraising activities throughout the U.S. This definition allows for a series of legal measures to be taken, designed to deprive the organization of financial capabilities.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.