Examining the various effects that COVID-19 might have on the Jewish state’s security, Efraim Inbar expresses his concerns about the logistical and economic strains the disease will likely put on the IDF. Militaries, moreover, depend on soldiers acting in unison in ways that are difficult to do while adhering to the social-distancing measures that can counteract the spread of contagion. As for the argument that Israel’s foes suffer from the epidemic as well, and may be less prepared to counter it—Inbar is not reassured:

The virus obviously does not affect enemy motivations to destroy the Jewish state. The proliferation of conspiracy theories holding Jews responsible for the coronavirus only intensifies such motivation. Poverty and sickness among Israel’s neighbors usually lead to the recruitment of desperate people for suicide bombings.

The assertion that the virus diverts enemy attention from the conflict with Israel and tempers the behavior of Israel’s enemies is, alas, wishful thinking; mainly of incorrigible optimists who have difficulty understanding the Middle Eastern mind. Iran continues its campaign to evict America from Iraq and its support of the Houthis in Yemen—despite the deadly results of the epidemic in Iran. Turkey continues its struggle to control Idlib. Its real constraint is Russian ambitions, not the coronavirus. Nor is there any evidence of moderation in Bashar al-Assad’s behavior.

National cohesion is a prerequisite for winning war, [however], and Israeli society is evincing outstanding national cohesion at present. Therefore, Israel has a decent chance at winning the war against the coronavirus.

Surveying news websites and social media on Sunday morning, I immediately found some intelligent and well-informed observers arguing that Iran deliberately warned the U.S. of its pending assault on Israel, and calibrated it so that there would be few casualties and minimal destructiveness, thus hoping to avoid major retaliation. In other words, this massive barrage was a face-saving gesture by the ayatollahs. Others disagreed. Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan put the issue to rest:

The Iranian April 13 missile-drone attack on Israel was very likely intended to cause significant damage below the threshold that would trigger a massive Israeli response. The attack was designed to succeed, not to fail. The strike package was modeled on those the Russians have used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect. The attack caused more limited damage than intended likely because the Iranians underestimated the tremendous advantages Israel has in defending against such strikes compared with Ukraine.

But that isn’t to say that Tehran achieved nothing:

The lessons that Iran will draw from this attack will allow it to build more successful strike packages in the future. The attack probably helped Iran identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli air-defense system. Iran will likely also share the lessons it learned in this attack with Russia.

Iran’s ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses with even a small number of large ballistic missiles presents serious security concerns for Israel. The only Iranian missiles that got through hit an Israeli military base, limiting the damage, but a future strike in which several ballistic missiles penetrate Israeli air defenses and hit Tel Aviv or Haifa could cause significant civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, including ports and energy. . . . Israel and its partners should not emerge from this successful defense with any sense of complacency.