In recent weeks, the assault by Bashar al-Assad and his Iranian and Russian allies on the Idlib province in northwestern Syria has created the greatest humanitarian crisis of the nine-year civil war. The incursion has displaced roughly one-million civilians over a 60-day period that began when the pro-Assad coalition pushed past the boundaries of the 2018 Sochi ceasefire. This led Ankara to respond with its most aggressive intervention to date, in which it succeeded in destroying Syrian positions and demonstrating some degree of tactical superiority. Nevertheless, at Gallia Lindenstrauss, Daniel Rakov, and Remi Daniel explain, the new ceasefire between Turkey and Russia shows that Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan failed to achieve any of his strategic goals:

The fighting in Idlib in recent weeks highlighted the clear conflict of interest between Russia and Turkey in Syria, but also showed that both sides have no interest in protracted confrontation—which in effect enabled Russia to steer all the parties into line to promote its own interests. [Nonetheless], Russia has shown restraint in face of the extensive damage to the Syrian forces and some Turkish fire on Hizballah and other Iranian proxies.

These developments are a reminder of the limitations of the Turkish position in the face of its attempt to adopt an independent foreign policy and to maneuver between Russia and the West. Notwithstanding claims of shared interests with Europe and the United States regarding Idlib, and notwithstanding the attempt to exert pressure on the European Union by moving thousands of refugees to the border between Turkey and Greece, Erdogan has been unable to recruit significant support from European countries or from NATO.

Israel, which has been waging a campaign to keep Iran from turning Syria into a staging ground for attacks, can draw some lessons from these events, beginning with Moscow’s apparent lack of interest in punishing Ankara for attacks on its allies:

Russian disregard of a significant Israeli attack in Syria on March supports the assessment that Israel has room to maneuver while Moscow is focused on other actors operating in Syria. Turkey’s political weakness and growing tension with Greece could encourage a trend ongoing since December—hints from Turkey of possible renewed normalization of relations with Israel. . . . Even without public normalization, there is room for specific cooperation between the two countries, if only for the assessment of the present situation in Syria. However, the prospects of success for such moves remain slim.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.