In recent weeks, the assault by Bashar al-Assad and his Iranian and Russian allies on the Idlib province in northwestern Syria has created the greatest humanitarian crisis of the nine-year civil war. The incursion has displaced roughly one-million civilians over a 60-day period that began when the pro-Assad coalition pushed past the boundaries of the 2018 Sochi ceasefire. This led Ankara to respond with its most aggressive intervention to date, in which it succeeded in destroying Syrian positions and demonstrating some degree of tactical superiority. Nevertheless, at Gallia Lindenstrauss, Daniel Rakov, and Remi Daniel explain, the new ceasefire between Turkey and Russia shows that Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan failed to achieve any of his strategic goals:
The fighting in Idlib in recent weeks highlighted the clear conflict of interest between Russia and Turkey in Syria, but also showed that both sides have no interest in protracted confrontation—which in effect enabled Russia to steer all the parties into line to promote its own interests. [Nonetheless], Russia has shown restraint in face of the extensive damage to the Syrian forces and some Turkish fire on Hizballah and other Iranian proxies.
These developments are a reminder of the limitations of the Turkish position in the face of its attempt to adopt an independent foreign policy and to maneuver between Russia and the West. Notwithstanding claims of shared interests with Europe and the United States regarding Idlib, and notwithstanding the attempt to exert pressure on the European Union by moving thousands of refugees to the border between Turkey and Greece, Erdogan has been unable to recruit significant support from European countries or from NATO.
Israel, which has been waging a campaign to keep Iran from turning Syria into a staging ground for attacks, can draw some lessons from these events, beginning with Moscow’s apparent lack of interest in punishing Ankara for attacks on its allies:
Russian disregard of a significant Israeli attack in Syria on March supports the assessment that Israel has room to maneuver while Moscow is focused on other actors operating in Syria. Turkey’s political weakness and growing tension with Greece could encourage a trend ongoing since December—hints from Turkey of possible renewed normalization of relations with Israel. . . . Even without public normalization, there is room for specific cooperation between the two countries, if only for the assessment of the present situation in Syria. However, the prospects of success for such moves remain slim.
Read more on Institute for National Security Studies: https://www.inss.org.il/publication/turkey-and-the-ceasefire-in-idlib/