Beware the Dangers of a “Prisoner Swap” with Hamas

Last week, the German press reported that Israel was close to making a deal with Hamas in which the terrorist group would release two civilians it is holding captive, as well as the bodies of two Israeli soldiers killed in the 2014 Gaza war. In return, Jerusalem would free hundreds of Palestinian terrorists from its prisons. Ruthie Blum notes that calling such an exchange a “prisoner swap” suggests that there is some “moral parity” between arrestees and hostages. But, she contends, there isn’t:

The terrorist organization that rules the Gaza Strip is not as stupid as it is evil, after all. Indeed, Hamas honchos are well aware of the value that the Jewish state places on human life in general, and on that of its own populace in particular. They also know that the Jewish state does not abandon soldiers, dead or alive, in the battlefield. [The bodies of] Hadar Goldin and Oren Shaul, then, are assets just as precious to Hamas as the captives Avera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed. All four are bargaining chips to hold over Israel’s head and cash in when the time is right.

The former Mossad official David Meidan, Netanyahu’s POW-MIA coordinator, [also] was the key negotiator in the deal that led to the release of Gilad Shalit in 2011—after five and a half years in Hamas captivity—in exchange for the release of 1,027 terrorists. Although Israelis across the political spectrum wept with joy when Shalit made it back home safely, many had opposed the deal for his release on two related grounds. One was that it served as additional incentive to Hamas to abduct soldiers for the purpose of extortion. The other was that the released terrorists would pose a grave danger to Israelis in uniform and out. Both proved correct.

As soon as the terrorists were out of jail, they picked up where they left off. Some of those deported to Gaza became part of Hamas’s top echelons; others got to work developing and firing missiles at Israel. Those sent to Judea and Samaria promptly began rioting, throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails at passing cars, and creating cells to mastermind more deadly attacks against Israelis. Many of the above were apprehended and reincarcerated. Shockingly but not surprisingly, those are among the prisoners whose release Hamas is demanding today.

Read more at Jerusalem Post

More about: Avera Mengistu, Hamas, Israeli Security, Palestinian terror

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security