Earlier this month, Jerusalem, with Washington’s help, carried out a major cyberattack on a state-of-the-art port in the Islamic Republic, disrupting its economic activities and days of severe traffic jams. The strike was prompted by a thwarted—but potentially deadly—Iranian cyberattack on Israel’s water and sewage systems. Ron Ben-Yishai explains:

Through computers, it is possible to attack electricity grids, water facilities, hospitals, chemical plants, transportation hubs, and pipelines that transport gas and other fuels, thereby inflicting thousands more casualties and material damage than kinetic bomb damage, i.e., “regular” strikes using precise and sophisticated weaponry, intense artillery shelling, or a massive bomb attack.

[T]he Iranian attack could have paralyzed Israel’s sewage systems, disrupting the water supply for farming and aggravating sanitation problems in some areas of the country at the height of the pandemic. The potential damage to Israel by this attack could have been greater than the damage that some Iranian missiles have caused from Lebanon and Syria.

Israel decided to respond in line with the strategic policy it adopted after the Second Lebanon War in 2006. It retaliates severely and disproportionately to attacks by a group or sovereign state but stays below the threshold of a declaration of war. . . . Israel has learned the hard way that steady deterrence is the best defense, as it prevents attacks before they occur.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.