At a press conference on Tuesday, the Palestinian Authority (PA) prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh announced that, should the Jewish state go ahead with plans to apply sovereignty to parts of the West Bank, his government will unilaterally declare Palestinians statehood. What, asks Amnon Lord, would the consequences be?

Yasir Arafat already declared the establishment of a Palestinian state in November 1988, when he was still in Tunisia. In November 2012, the Palestinian Authority launched its diplomatic campaign to upgrade its status within the international community. As a result, many entities across the globe already view it as a “state.” For example, the ever-menacing International Criminal Court recognizes a Palestinian state, ergo the PA’s routine threat of “going to The Hague.”

That same year, the United Nations passed a resolution to upgrade the PA’s status from “non-state observer” to non-member state. . . . Many countries around the world circuitously recognize the PA as a state in such a way that it isn’t always clear what they mean when they say “recognition.” It appears the only development of substance and of potential concern to Israel—in the future—is . . . the [election in the U.S.] of a Democratic administration that would recognize a Palestinian state. And even then, Israel’s answer will be: we’re ready to negotiate peace with the Palestinians.

Since the war began, there has been a tension between Israel’s two primary goals: the destruction of Hamas and the liberation of the hostages. Many see in Israel’s renewed campaign in Gaza a sacrifice of the latter goal in pursuit of the former. But Meir Ben-Shabbat suggests that Israel’s attacks aim to bring Hamas back to the negotiating table:

The timing of the attack, its intensity, and the extent of casualties surprised Hamas. Its senior leaders are likely still wondering whether this is a limited action meant to shock and send a message or the beginning of a sustained operation. The statement by its senior officials linking the renewal of fighting to the fate of the hostages hints at the way it may act to stop Israel. This threat requires the Israeli political leadership to formulate a series of draconian measures and declare that they will be carried out if Hamas harms the hostages.

Ostensibly, Israel’s interest in receiving the hostages and continuing the fighting stands in complete contradiction to that of Hamas, but in practice Hamas has flexibility that has not yet been exhausted. This stems from the large number of hostages in its possession, which allows it to realize additional deals for some of them, and this is what Israel has been aiming its efforts toward.

We must concede that the challenge Israel faces is not simple, but the alternative Hamas presents—surrendering to its dictates and leaving it as the central power factor in Gaza—limits its options. . . . Tightening and significantly hardening the blockade along with increasing pressure through airstrikes, evacuating areas and capturing them, may force Hamas to make its stance more flexible.

But Ben-Shabbat also acknowledges the danger in this approach. The war’s renewal puts the hostages in greater danger. And as Israel makes threats, it will be obliged to carry them out.