Currently, Hamas is holding hostage the bodies of two IDF soldiers killed in the 2014 Gaza war, along with two mentally disturbed Israeli civilians. Jerusalem is reportedly considering releasing Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the two hostages and the soldiers’ remains. But, argues Nadav Shragai, experience has shown the imprudence of such exchanges:

Since 1985, Israel has released thousands of terrorists as gestures, exchange deals, and in the framework of peace plans. About half of them resumed terrorist activity. Thus far, hundreds of Israelis have been murdered and some 3,500 wounded in attacks committed by these former prisoners. The so-called Jibril agreement of 1985 freed 1,150 terrorists who became the backbone of the first intifada, [in exchange for the release of three soldiers who had been captured during the First Lebanon War]. According to a study the Defense Ministry ran on a sample group of 238 of those prisoners, 114 were confirmed to have gone back to terrorism.

Half or more of the 7,000 terrorists released following the Oslo Accords reintegrated into Palestinian terrorist infrastructure and took part in the second intifada. . . . The former Shin Bet director Yoram Cohen, who supported [the 2011 deal that obtained the release of Gilad Shalit in exchange for 1,027 prisoners], stated frankly at the time that, based on past experience, some 60 percent of prisoners released would go back to terrorism and 12 percent would wind up back in prison.

Following Shalit’s release, the Israeli government convened the Shamgar commission to study the issue. It recommended, inter alia, that “a captive Israeli soldier should be freed in exchange for no more than a handful of terrorist prisoners, and that a body of an Israeli casualty should be ‘redeemed’ for one terrorist’s body.” Shragai also cites additional suggestions from the reserve general and Knesset member Uzi Dayan:

The first choice is to free captives and hostages through military means, by force—direct or indirect—[or] if there is an operation in Gaza, even by abducting [senior] Hamas members. . . . That’s what we did in the 1970s when we captured Syrian generals to free three pilots who fell into Syrian captivity.

Last Tuesday, the Houthis—the faction now ruling much of Yemen—said that they intend to renew attacks on international shipping through the Red and Arabian Seas. They had for the most part paused their attacks following the January 19 Israel-Hamas cease-fire, but their presence has continued to scare away maritime traffic near the Yemeni coast, with terrible consequences for the global economy.

The U.S. responded on Saturday by initiating strikes on Houthi missile depots, command-and-control centers, and propaganda outlets, and has promised that the attacks will continue for days, if not weeks. The Houthis responded by launching drones, and possibly missiles, at American naval ships, apparently without result. Another missile fired from Yemen struck the Sinai, but was likely aimed at Israel. As Ari Heistein has written in Mosaic, it may take a sustained and concerted effort to stop the Houthis, who have high tolerance for casualties—but this is a start. Ron Ben-Yishai provides some context:

The goal is to punish the Houthis for directly targeting Western naval vessels in the Red Sea while also exerting indirect pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program. . . . While the Biden administration did conduct airstrikes against the Houthis, it refrained from a proactive military campaign, fearing a wider regional war. However, following the collapse of Iran’s axis—including Hizballah’s heavy losses in Lebanon and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria—the Trump administration appears unafraid of such an escalation.

Iran, the thinking goes, will also get the message that the U.S. isn’t afraid to use force, or risk the consequences of retaliation—and will keep this in mind as it considers negotiations over its nuclear program. Tamir Hayman adds:

The Houthis are the last proxy of the Shiite axis that have neither reassessed their actions nor restrained their weapons. Throughout the campaign against the Yemenite terrorist organization, the U.S.-led coalition has made operational mistakes: Houthi regime infrastructure was not targeted; the organization’s leaders were not eliminated; no sustained operational continuity was maintained—only actions to remove immediate threats; no ground operations took place, not even special-forces missions; and Iran has not paid a price for its proxy’s actions.

But if this does not stop the Houthis, it will project weakness—not just toward Hamas but primarily toward Iran—and Trump’s power diplomacy will be seen as hollow. The true test is one of output, not input. The only question that matters is not how many strikes the U.S. carries out, but whether the Red Sea reopens to all vessels. We will wait and see—for now, things look brighter than they did before.