In 1950, Omar Bradley, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that Washington ought to treat the IDF—which had demonstrated its effectiveness in the 1948 war—as a reliable partner in protecting American interests in the region. But his recommendations were dismissed by a State Department that continued to see Israel as a liability. The degree to which Bradley’s view has since become mainstream is made evident by joint exercises undertaken by the Israeli and American air forces in March, writes Yoram Ettinger:

While Israel benefits from the unprecedented, multiple capabilities of the U.S. air force, the latter leverages the unique operational experience of its Israeli counterpart. The Israeli military, in general, and Israel’s air force, in particular, have emerged as the most cost-effective, battle-tested laboratory for the U.S. defense industries and armed forces.

In fact, Israel’s air-force battle experience and technological capabilities contributed to the development of the F-35, systematically enhancing its capabilities, by sharing with the U.S. manufacturer operational, maintenance, and repair lessons. This flow of Israeli experience . . . has spared American defense industries many years of costly research and development, and has advanced U.S. competitiveness in the global market. . . . Moreover, the unique combat experience of Israeli pilots—who always fly within the range of enemies’ radar and missiles—has yielded more daring and innovative battle tactics, which are regularly shared with the American air force.

As Ettinger goes on to catalogue, the reversal of the American attitude happened gradually, but the main turning point came with the Six-Day War:

The June 1967 war transformed Israel into the most effective power-projecting U.S. beachhead in the Middle East and beyond, extending Washington’s strategic reach with no need for additional American troops on the ground. The resounding Israeli victory obliterated the military posture of then-radical, pro-Soviet Egypt, aborting an Egyptian drive to become the effective pan-Arab leader, . . . while toppling pro-U.S. Arab regimes. [In addition], a team of 25 American military experts . . . spent three months in Israel, studying Israel’s battle tactics and scrutinizing Soviet military systems captured by Israel.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.