In 1950, Omar Bradley, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that Washington ought to treat the IDF—which had demonstrated its effectiveness in the 1948 war—as a reliable partner in protecting American interests in the region. But his recommendations were dismissed by a State Department that continued to see Israel as a liability. The degree to which Bradley’s view has since become mainstream is made evident by joint exercises undertaken by the Israeli and American air forces in March, writes Yoram Ettinger:

While Israel benefits from the unprecedented, multiple capabilities of the U.S. air force, the latter leverages the unique operational experience of its Israeli counterpart. The Israeli military, in general, and Israel’s air force, in particular, have emerged as the most cost-effective, battle-tested laboratory for the U.S. defense industries and armed forces.

In fact, Israel’s air-force battle experience and technological capabilities contributed to the development of the F-35, systematically enhancing its capabilities, by sharing with the U.S. manufacturer operational, maintenance, and repair lessons. This flow of Israeli experience . . . has spared American defense industries many years of costly research and development, and has advanced U.S. competitiveness in the global market. . . . Moreover, the unique combat experience of Israeli pilots—who always fly within the range of enemies’ radar and missiles—has yielded more daring and innovative battle tactics, which are regularly shared with the American air force.

As Ettinger goes on to catalogue, the reversal of the American attitude happened gradually, but the main turning point came with the Six-Day War:

The June 1967 war transformed Israel into the most effective power-projecting U.S. beachhead in the Middle East and beyond, extending Washington’s strategic reach with no need for additional American troops on the ground. The resounding Israeli victory obliterated the military posture of then-radical, pro-Soviet Egypt, aborting an Egyptian drive to become the effective pan-Arab leader, . . . while toppling pro-U.S. Arab regimes. [In addition], a team of 25 American military experts . . . spent three months in Israel, studying Israel’s battle tactics and scrutinizing Soviet military systems captured by Israel.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.