Examining a reliable poll of Egyptian public opinion—a rare thing in this unfree country—David Pollock highlights some key findings about attitudes toward the Jewish state and its conflict with the Palestinians:

[T]he Egyptian public is much more concerned about domestic problems, including public health, than any foreign-policy issue. And when it comes to foreign affairs and U.S. policy, . . . only a third of Egyptians now rank “pushing for a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict” in first place as their priority for U.S. engagement in the region. The majority of responses to this question are split among U.S. action with regard to Iran, Yemen, Syria, and Libya. And a third of Egyptians say that “the Palestinians and the Israelis are both to blame for their continuing conflict.”

This pattern is likely due in part to the Egyptian public’s very low expectation for progress on the Palestinian problem. A mere 16 percent have even “somewhat positive” expectations of the new Israeli government elected this spring. And even fewer, just nine percent, have a favorable opinion of the Trump peace plan. [Nonetheless], 49 percent, as in previous years, continue to say that good relations with the U.S. are important for their country.

But none of this means attitudes toward Israel have warmed:

There is . . . very little popular support for further “normalization” with Israel. A mere 6 percent agree that “people who want to have business or sports contacts with Israelis should be allowed to do so.” By contrast, half the Egyptian public “strongly disagrees” with that assertion.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.