Why Israel Must Maintain Its Presence in the Jordan Valley

While Dan Schueftan is skeptical about the benefits of applying Israeli sovereignty to the West Bank settlements, located mostly in the vicinity of Jerusalem, he believes that the Jewish state has much to gain from applying its sovereignty to the Jordan Valley. Otherwise, Israel would be left entirely unable to protect its eastern border:

In 2014 General John Allen, the security adviser to then-Secretary of State John Kerry, suggested a plan that was based on much goodwill yet little understanding of the conditions in the Middle East. . . . The plan included Palestinian sovereignty in the Jordan Valley. The answer to Israel’s security fears would be sensors, unmanned aircraft, satellites, and other technological devices. There was also talk of foreign troops, possibly American, being stationed along the banks of the Jordan River, and a possibility of a U.S.-Israel deal ensuring American support for unilateral moves by Israel when responding to threats on its security.

Establishing [sovereignty] in the Jordan Valley entails abandoning the delusional idea of Israeli and Jordanian security based on technology and foreign presence. What Israel needs is not information on threats and the hope that someone else will respond before it’s too late. Rather, it needs deterrence that comes with a good chance of prevention and an Israeli force that will neutralize threats when needed.

A scheme like the Allen plan is much worse than no arrangement at all. Without it, Israel acts “defiantly” against threats when it sees them, and foreign diplomats protest after they are successfully neutralized. Since decolonization in the mid-20th century, the fate of a foreign military presence in sovereign land of a hostile country has been grim. This scheme will postpone and [enfeeble] the Israeli response to perceived threats and will give the Palestinians an effective tool to damage Israel’s relations with the U.S.

Read more at Israel Hayom

More about: Israeli Security, John Kerry, Jordan Valley, Peace Process

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF