In recent months the struggle for control of Libya has escalated as the forces of Khalifa Haftar—backed by Egypt and Russia—fight against the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned and Turkey-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). By establishing its influence in North Africa, Ankara hopes to counteract the deepening alliance among Greece, Cyprus, and Israel and cut off its access to European markets. This alliance, under the formal rubric of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMFG), began with collaboration in the extraction of undersea fossil fuels and has evolved into broader economic and military cooperation. Eran Lerman explains what all this means for Jerusalem:

The role played by Russian mercenaries, and now by pro-Assad Syrian “volunteers,” may be troubling; but the consequences of the total collapse of [Haftar’s forces] would be more severe.

[It is thus necessary for] the relevant EMFG nations to coordinate their policies effectively. The key players are Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. Tripartite summits should be convened as soon as possible. Italy has long been relatively friendly towards the GNA, but suspicious of Erdogan’s designs: [it now] may be indicating a willingness to act to curb Turkish ambitions.

Israel’s role must, by necessity, be diplomatic and discreet. It should focus upon . . . forging a common position of all EMGF countries.

Meanwhile, amidst many other challenges, the IDF—navy, air force, and intelligence—as well as Israel’s defense and intelligence establishment as a whole should start preparing for the darker scenario of having to face an overt Turkish bid to control fully the eastern Mediterranean sea lanes of communication.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.