In recent months the struggle for control of Libya has escalated as the forces of Khalifa Haftar—backed by Egypt and Russia—fight against the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned and Turkey-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). By establishing its influence in North Africa, Ankara hopes to counteract the deepening alliance among Greece, Cyprus, and Israel and cut off its access to European markets. This alliance, under the formal rubric of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMFG), began with collaboration in the extraction of undersea fossil fuels and has evolved into broader economic and military cooperation. Eran Lerman explains what all this means for Jerusalem:

The role played by Russian mercenaries, and now by pro-Assad Syrian “volunteers,” may be troubling; but the consequences of the total collapse of [Haftar’s forces] would be more severe.

[It is thus necessary for] the relevant EMFG nations to coordinate their policies effectively. The key players are Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. Tripartite summits should be convened as soon as possible. Italy has long been relatively friendly towards the GNA, but suspicious of Erdogan’s designs: [it now] may be indicating a willingness to act to curb Turkish ambitions.

Israel’s role must, by necessity, be diplomatic and discreet. It should focus upon . . . forging a common position of all EMGF countries.

Meanwhile, amidst many other challenges, the IDF—navy, air force, and intelligence—as well as Israel’s defense and intelligence establishment as a whole should start preparing for the darker scenario of having to face an overt Turkish bid to control fully the eastern Mediterranean sea lanes of communication.

If there is to be peace, Palestinians will have to unlearn the hatred of Israel they have imbibed during nearly two decades of Hamas rule. This will be a difficult task, but Cole Aronson argues, drawing on the experiences of World War II, that Israel has already gotten off to a strong start:

The population’s compliance can . . . be won by a new regime that satisfies its immediate material needs, even if that new regime is sponsored by a government until recently at war with the population’s former regime. Axis civilians were made needy through bombing. Peaceful compliance with the Allies became a good alternative to supporting violent resistance to the Allies.

Israel’s current campaign makes a moderate Gaza more likely, not less. Destroying Hamas not only deprives Islamists of the ability to rule—it proves the futility of armed resistance to Israel, a condition for peace. The destruction of buildings not only deprives Hamas of its hideouts. It also gives ordinary Palestinians strong reasons to shun groups planning to replicate Hamas’s behavior.