In the wake of the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah, the UN deployed its Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to keep the two armies apart, and to prevent Hizballah from operating in the area between the Litani River and the Israel-Lebanon border. But UNIFIL has failed spectacularly in the latter part of its mission—although that hasn’t prevented the various concerned parties from maintaining the illusion that it is doing its job. Assaf Orion writes:

European contributors [to the force] enjoy the political-military influence it confers; Beirut enjoys the revenues and veneer of legitimacy associated with hosting a sizable UN force; Hizballah leaders enjoy UNIFIL paying for projects in their southern heartland and hiring hundreds of local staff, so long as the force stays out of their business; and so forth. Another year of no change would please many of these actors, Hizballah most of all.

Yet this status quo is an illusion. . . . [T]he Lebanese government has stepped up its efforts to prevent UNIFIL from encountering or exposing Hizballah activities . . . and Hizballah has increased its strength and activities in UNIFIL’s area of operations. This state of affairs is more than just a mission failure—it represents a dangerous slope toward unwarranted escalation.

In August, the Security Council will hold its annual vote as to whether to extend UNIFIL’s mandate. Orion suggests steps the U.S. and its allies can take to reform the force, including, paradoxically, shrinking it.

The force should be immediately reduced by 10-20 percent, its maritime component decreased by one vessel, and its maximum authorized number cut from 15,000 to 8,000-10,000. . . . These reductions would show Beirut that military support is neither infinite nor unconditional, while prodding it to fulfill its commitments to [disarm Hizballah], reducing the risk to peacekeepers in the event of escalation, and curbing the amount of UN funding [that ends up in the hands of] Hizballah’s base of supporters.

Even more importantly, Orion argues, the Lebanese government must allow UNIFIL unrestricted access throughout its area of operations, which it does not now do. And the U.S. should make clear that it will use its veto to end UNIFIL’s mandate if such measures are not taken.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.