Either Require UN Peacekeepers in Lebanon To Do Their Job, or Send Them Home

In the wake of the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah, the UN deployed its Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to keep the two armies apart, and to prevent Hizballah from operating in the area between the Litani River and the Israel-Lebanon border. But UNIFIL has failed spectacularly in the latter part of its mission—although that hasn’t prevented the various concerned parties from maintaining the illusion that it is doing its job. Assaf Orion writes:

European contributors [to the force] enjoy the political-military influence it confers; Beirut enjoys the revenues and veneer of legitimacy associated with hosting a sizable UN force; Hizballah leaders enjoy UNIFIL paying for projects in their southern heartland and hiring hundreds of local staff, so long as the force stays out of their business; and so forth. Another year of no change would please many of these actors, Hizballah most of all.

Yet this status quo is an illusion. . . . [T]he Lebanese government has stepped up its efforts to prevent UNIFIL from encountering or exposing Hizballah activities . . . and Hizballah has increased its strength and activities in UNIFIL’s area of operations. This state of affairs is more than just a mission failure—it represents a dangerous slope toward unwarranted escalation.

In August, the Security Council will hold its annual vote as to whether to extend UNIFIL’s mandate. Orion suggests steps the U.S. and its allies can take to reform the force, including, paradoxically, shrinking it.

The force should be immediately reduced by 10-20 percent, its maritime component decreased by one vessel, and its maximum authorized number cut from 15,000 to 8,000-10,000. . . . These reductions would show Beirut that military support is neither infinite nor unconditional, while prodding it to fulfill its commitments to [disarm Hizballah], reducing the risk to peacekeepers in the event of escalation, and curbing the amount of UN funding [that ends up in the hands of] Hizballah’s base of supporters.

Even more importantly, Orion argues, the Lebanese government must allow UNIFIL unrestricted access throughout its area of operations, which it does not now do. And the U.S. should make clear that it will use its veto to end UNIFIL’s mandate if such measures are not taken.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Israeli Security, Lebanon, Peacekeepers, U.S. Foreign policy, United Nations

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF