In response to the possibility that Jerusalem will attempt to apply its sovereignty to certain areas of the West Bank, Mahmoud Abbas has threatened to dissolve the Palestinian Authority (PA). Such a step could, at worst, plunge the area into chaos. At best, it would leave Israel to shoulder the expenses of providing basic civil services to the Palestinians living in the areas now under PA control—everything from education to welfare for the indigent to policing traffic laws. Of course, Abbas has been threatening to take this step for years, and never made good. Yossi Kuperwasser nonetheless examines the ways Abbas might do so (including temporary or partial dissolution), the possible consequences, and the actions Israel would be forced to take in various scenarios. Kuperwasser concludes:

[W]hile continuing the [present] situation is preferred, Israel can deal with the other alternatives. Some [possible outcomes even] present the possibility that an alternative leadership that may emerge, inside or outside the PA, which may lead to a different view of Israel-Palestinian relations and raise new opportunities.

In any case, Israel does not have to be hostage to the PA and make the PA’s existence and its functioning central elements of Israeli security, especially so long as the PA adheres to a Palestinian narrative that . . . calls for the destruction of Zionism and negates any arrangement recognizing Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. At the same time, the PA encourages terrorism by paying salaries to terrorists and their families and incites hatred against Israel both domestically and on the Arab and international stages. It should be clear that no Palestinian is going to accept any unilateral Israeli move regarding the legal status of any territory, even if some may be willing to assume responsibility for the daily needs of the Palestinian population and to lead the Palestinians in their attempt to promote their national interests.

Analyzing the recent direct Iranian attack on Israel, and Israel’s security situation more generally, Michael Oren looks to the 2015 agreement to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. That, and President Biden’s efforts to resurrect the deal after Donald Trump left it, are in his view the source of the current crisis:

Of the original motivations for the deal—blocking Iran’s path to the bomb and transforming Iran into a peaceful nation—neither remained. All Biden was left with was the ability to kick the can down the road and to uphold Barack Obama’s singular foreign-policy achievement.

In order to achieve that result, the administration has repeatedly refused to punish Iran for its malign actions:

Historians will survey this inexplicable record and wonder how the United States not only allowed Iran repeatedly to assault its citizens, soldiers, and allies but consistently rewarded it for doing so. They may well conclude that in a desperate effort to avoid getting dragged into a regional Middle Eastern war, the U.S. might well have precipitated one.

While America’s friends in the Middle East, especially Israel, have every reason to feel grateful for the vital assistance they received in intercepting Iran’s missile and drone onslaught, they might also ask what the U.S. can now do differently to deter Iran from further aggression. . . . Tehran will see this weekend’s direct attack on Israel as a victory—their own—for their ability to continue threatening Israel and destabilizing the Middle East with impunity.

Israel, of course, must respond differently. Our target cannot simply be the Iranian proxies that surround our country and that have waged war on us since October 7, but, as the Saudis call it, “the head of the snake.”