In recent years, the government of Narendra Modi has been trying to build up India’s own defense industry, so that the country can become less reliant on imports. While it may seem counterintuitive, this move will only enhance the already robust cooperation between New Delhi and Jerusalem in the area of military technology, since Israeli companies can help India learn to make advanced equipment by itself. Moreover, the two can work together to develop new technology. Such collaboration is part and parcel of the growing bond between the two nations, writes Alvite Ningthoujam:

For the last good five years, India has remained the second largest importer of arms in the world. . . . As it is, Israel’s share in India’s defense market began to increase significantly from 2014 on. During the period past five years, India’s arms imports from Israel increased by 175 percent, making the latter New Delhi’s second largest supplier of major arms.

It is evident, [however] that the growing strategic partnership between India and Israel increasingly involves long-term co-development and defense-production programs as well as technical support. These aspects are crucial from the standpoint of India’s current military-modernization initiatives and the drive for localized production of armaments. Both countries consider the collaboration between Indian and Israeli defense firms on sophisticated defense technologies to be a success.

The strengthening of ties in this specific domain has come at this juncture when the two countries are facing both traditional and non-traditional security threats. Increasing demand for defense items due to these emerging security challenges, the quest for technological advancement in defense industries, and Israel’s readiness to meet some of the requirements of India, will lead to further expansion of defense cooperation. As Israel continues to design and develop a wide range of state-of-the-art weapons systems, it will remain an important source of defense equipment and technology for India. And Israel’s technological expertise is sure to be a key source in India’s drive to develop a self-reliant defense industry.

Since the war began, there has been a tension between Israel’s two primary goals: the destruction of Hamas and the liberation of the hostages. Many see in Israel’s renewed campaign in Gaza a sacrifice of the latter goal in pursuit of the former. But Meir Ben-Shabbat suggests that Israel’s attacks aim to bring Hamas back to the negotiating table:

The timing of the attack, its intensity, and the extent of casualties surprised Hamas. Its senior leaders are likely still wondering whether this is a limited action meant to shock and send a message or the beginning of a sustained operation. The statement by its senior officials linking the renewal of fighting to the fate of the hostages hints at the way it may act to stop Israel. This threat requires the Israeli political leadership to formulate a series of draconian measures and declare that they will be carried out if Hamas harms the hostages.

Ostensibly, Israel’s interest in receiving the hostages and continuing the fighting stands in complete contradiction to that of Hamas, but in practice Hamas has flexibility that has not yet been exhausted. This stems from the large number of hostages in its possession, which allows it to realize additional deals for some of them, and this is what Israel has been aiming its efforts toward.

We must concede that the challenge Israel faces is not simple, but the alternative Hamas presents—surrendering to its dictates and leaving it as the central power factor in Gaza—limits its options. . . . Tightening and significantly hardening the blockade along with increasing pressure through airstrikes, evacuating areas and capturing them, may force Hamas to make its stance more flexible.

But Ben-Shabbat also acknowledges the danger in this approach. The war’s renewal puts the hostages in greater danger. And as Israel makes threats, it will be obliged to carry them out.